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THE  TURBULENT EVENTS in the world economy since 1973  have several 
times prompted  the call for the major  countries  in the Organization  for 
Economic Cooperation  and Development (OECD) to coordinate  their 
macroeconomic  policies.I In the immediate  aftermath  of the 1973 oil 
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price shock, for example, the finance ministers  of the main industrial 
countries  made  a commitment,  only partly  fulfilled,  to avoid  deflationary 
policies  designed  to pass current  account  deficits  on to partner  countries. 
Following  the  deep  recession  of 1974-75,  the Carter  administration  urged 
in 1977-78  a "locomotive approach"  for world recovery, in which the 
major  economies were to act  jointly to stimulate  a world  expansion.  This 
policy was adopted by the heads of state at the 1978 Bonn summit 
conference. After the world  recession of 1980-82,  several  policymakers 
and  economists  called  for ajoint world  reflation,  but  in this case the U.S. 
administration  stood firmly  opposed to such a coordinated  policy.2  And 
recently, several economists have advocated that the European  econ- 
omies embrace  more expansionary  fiscal policies in return  for reduced 
long-run  U.S. deficits.' The implication  appears  to be that while both 
the United States and  Europe  would  benefit  from  such a swap in policy, 
neither  side can or will undertake  the prescribed  policies independently. 
Advocacy of international  coordination  has been far more plentiful 
than actual implementation.  The 1978 Bonn summit is the principal 
example of a macroeconomic policy package adopted by the major 
economies. While  there  are  few cases of successful  policy coordination, 
advocates of coordination  argue  that there are many  illustrations  of the 
need for coordination.  Individual  economies have on several occasions 
tried  to expand  in the midst  of a world  contraction.  The United  Kingdom 
and Sweden tried  to bridge  the world  recession of 1974,  and while they 
succeeded in the short run in maintaining  gross national  product, the 
longer-run  consequences were large balance  of payments  deficits, cur- 
rency depreciation, and eventually a sharp policy reversal (in 1976 
Britain actually required a stabilization  loan from the International 
2. A clear  statement  of the  administration's  position  may  be found  in Martin  Feldstein, 
"The World  Economy  Today," The  Economist,  June 11-17, 1983.  He was responding  to 
other writers in The Economist who had urged a coordinated  global expansion;  these 
writers  and the dates their  articles  appeared  were Helmut  Schmidt  (February  26-March 
4, 1983),  Valery  Giscard  d'Estaing  (May  21-27, 1983),  and  C. Fred  Bergsten  and  Lawrence 
R. Klein (April  23-30, 1983).  One of the most widely publicized  calls for a coordinated 
reflation  came in 1982  from  a group  of 26 economists  from several  countries  in Institute 
for International  Economics, "Promoting  World Recovery: A  Statement on Global 
Economic  Strategy"  (Washington,  D.C.: IIE, 1982). 
3. See Richard  Layard  and others, "Europe:  The Case for Unsustainable  Growth," 
Discussion  Paper  (Brussels:  Centre  for European  Policy Studies,  Macroeconomic  Policy 
Group,  May 1984).  Others  in the Macroeconomic  Policy  Group  participating  in the study 
were  Giorgio  Basevi, Olivier  Blanchard,  Willem  Buiter,  and  Rudiger  Dornbusch. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  3 
Monetary  Fund). As one Swede remarked,  "We tried to build  a bridge 
in 1974,  but ended up with a pier instead." Similar  episodes include  the 
U.S. expansion during  1976-78  and the Mitterrand  policy in France in 
1981.  In all of these cases, external  constraints  played a significant  role 
in limiting  the benefits  of expansion. 
These cases suggest that unilateral  expansionary  policies may be 
difficult  to sustain  and  costly in terms  of inflation  and  foreign  borrowing. 
Advocates of coordination  point  out that  if every country  fears  unilateral 
expansion, then all can get stuck in a low-level equilibrium  even if all 
would like to expand. But it is too facile to jump to the conclusion that 
absence of  coordination explains much or most of  the worldwide 
contraction  in recent years. When West Germany  stuck with contrac- 
tionary  policies in 1981  at the time of the French expansion, it was not 
merely  a German  fear of external  imbalance  that was to blame  but also 
German  fears of rekindling  inflation  through  any demand  stimulus  at all, 
whether  or not matched  from  abroad.  Moreover,  there are cases where 
countries  have successfully expanded  without  a currency  collapse, the 
most recent being the U.S. expansion since the fourth  quarter  of 1982. 
Perhaps  it is the policy mix, as well as the overall policy stance, that 
determines  whether  a unilateral  expansion  is feasible. 
In our  view, the case for coordination  must  rest on the demonstration 
that all countries  can benefit, in terms  of their  own policy goals, from a 
coordinated  package of macroeconomic  policies, and not on the mere 
fact that a unilateral  expansion  is painful.  More precisely, the case for 
coordination  must rest on the demonstration  of a Pareto  improvement 
in the economic outcome. If German-French  cooperation  in 1981  had 
raised output and inflation  in both countries, it may well be true that 
France would have been better off relative to French goals, but could 
we guarantee  the same  for inflation-minded  Germany? 
Most formal  exercises arguing  for a global policy package miss this 
point. A demonstration  that "global  multipliers"  are higher  than "indi- 
vidual country" multipliers  is not a proof of the Pareto improvement 
from  ajoint reflation.4  Similarly,  a demonstration  that a policy package 
4. An example of a study comparing  single-country  and multicountry  multipliers  is 
Flemming  Larsen,  John  Llewellyn,  and Stephen  Potter, "International  Economic  Link- 
ages," OECD  Economic Studies, no. 1 (Autumn  1983),  pp. 43-91. The multipliers  are 
valuable  for macroeconomic  forecasting  and are suggestive regarding  the gains from 
coordination  but are not in themselves a proof of the Pareto  improvement  from policy 
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has "nice outcomes"  for several  countries  is also not sufficient.  A widely 
publicized Project Link analysis of global reflation  showed that West 
Germany,  Japan,  the United Kingdom,  and the United States together 
could engineer a noninflationary  recovery.5  But it did not show what 
each country  could do on its own nor  how much  gain  was to be had  from 
coordination  per se (in fact, in the Link model, some countries  on their 
own can engineer a recovery with falling prices because some of the 
country  models suppose  that  cyclical productivity  gains  in recovery are 
passed through  to lower prices). 
Our  goal in this paper  is to recast the arguments  for coordination  in 
terms  that  consider  each country's  macroeconomic  goals so that  we may 
evaluate whether  the major  countries  can each raise economic welfare 
through  a joint policy action. In doing this we spell out the reasons to 
believe that  uncoordinated  policymaking  across  countries  will indeed  be 
inefficient (in the sense that Pareto improvements  are possible); our 
reasoning about such policymaking  follows the theoretical work of 
Hamada,  Canzoneri  and  Gray,  Johansen,  Miller  and  Salmon,  and  Sachs.6 
We then attempt to measure how large the gains to coordination  are 
likely to be. For this purpose, we take two large-scale econometric 
models, the Japanese  Economic  Planning  Agency (EPA)  model and the 
Federal  Reserve Board's  Multicountry  model  (MCM)  as "true" models 
5. The analysis  was described  by Bergsten  and Klein  in The  Economist,  April  23-30, 
1983. 
6. The pioneering  studies  in this area  are  by Koichi  Hamada  and  include  "Alternative 
Exchange Rate Systems and the Interdependence  of Monetary  Policies," in Robert  Z. 
Aliber, ed.,  National  Monetary Policies  and the International Financial  System (Univer- 
sity of Chicago  Press, 1974),  pp. 13-33, and "A Strategic  Analysis  of Monetary  Interde- 
pendence," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 84 (August 1976),  pp. 677-99. Recent 
studies include Matthew  E. Canzoneri  and Jo Anna Gray, "Two Essays on Monetary 
Policy in an Interdependent  World,"  International  Finance  Discussion  Paper  219 (Board 
of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, February  1983);  LeifJohansen,  "A Note on 
the Possibility  of an International  Equilibrium  with Low Levels of Activity," Journal  of 
International  Economics,  vol. 13  (November  1982),  pp. 257-65; M. Miller  and  M. Salmon, 
"Dynamic  Games  and the Time  Inconsistency  of Optimal  Policies  in Open  Economies," 
paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on the 
International  Coordination  of Economic  Policy, August 1983;  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Inter- 
national  Policy  Coordination  in a Dynamic  Macroeconomic  Model," Working  Paper  1166 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  July 1983).  For a recent survey of theoretical 
issues, see Richard  N. Cooper, "Economic  Interdependence  and Coordination  of Eco- 
nomic Policies," in R. Jones and Peter B.  Kenen, eds. Handbook of International 
Economics  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  forthcoming). Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  5 
of the world  and  focus on policy cooordination  among  the United States, 
West Germany,  and  Japan. 
Our  strategy  for measuring  the gains  from  coordination  is to compare 
two equilibriums:  one in which each country's  macroeconomic  author- 
ities pursue  optimal  policies taking  as given the actions abroad,  and  one 
in which the authorities  bargain  over a coordinated  package  of policies. 
The first  type of equilibrium  is referred  to as a "Nash" or "noncooper- 
ative" equilibrium,  and  the second as a "cooperative"  or "bargaining" 
equilibrium.  We then ask how much  each country's welfare  (measured 
in units of GNP, as described later) is  raised in moving from the 
noncooperative  to cooperative  equilibrium. 
The gains from coordination  in this sense are certainly  present, but 
they appear  to be modest, at least when the United States, Germany, 
and  Japan  are the only countries  taking  policy actions  in response  to the 
coordination.  Perhaps  the United  States  could  gain  the utility  equivalent 
of one-half  percentage  point of GNP in each of the next few years from 
a more  coordinated  expansion;  the West German  gain  is about  the same, 
and the Japanese gain is somewhat higher. It does not appear that 
cooperation  among the leading three economies could be the decisive 
factor in world recovery. We note later several qualifications  to this 
conclusion.  Most  important,  these estimates  ignore  any  policy  responses 
outside of the United States, Germany,  and  Japan  that  might  arise  from 
the coordinated  decisions of these three  large  countries.  For example, if 
German  macroeconomic  policy is matched throughout  the European 
Community  (EC), then  the gains  to coordination  should  be at least twice 
as large. 
It should  be stressed that  our measures  refer  to only one type of gain 
from coordination.  We abstract  from many other possible gains that 
advocates  of coordination  often mention.  We assume, for example, that 
policymakers  know the "true" model of the world economy and have 
perfect knowledge of the actions taken in other countries. Thus, we 
abstract from the informational  gains that might emerge from closer 
coordination  of policies. Also, we abstract  from the possible strength- 
ening of  political ties that might follow a closer harmonization  of 
macroeconomic  policies. 
Though the major economies are richly linked in commodity and 
financial  markets,  the direct effects of commodity  trade on macroeco- 
nomic  interdependence  remain  surprisingly  small;  at the core, it is these 6  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 1.  Exports and Imports as Share of Country's GNP,  1982 
Percent 
Trading  partner 
Euro-  Other 
pean  indus- 
United  West  Com-  trialized  Rest of 
Country  States  Germany  Japan  munity  countries  world  Totala 
United 
States 
Exports  ...  0.3  0.7  1.6  1.6  3.1  7.0 
Imports  ...  0.4  1.3  1.4  1.9  3.5  8.1 
European 
Community 
Exports  1.7  2.9  0.2  12.9  3.1  7.0  24.9 
Imports  2.2  3.3  0.8  12.9  3.1  7.4  26.4 
Japan 
Exports  3.4  0.5  ...  1.6  1.1  6.8  13.0 
Imports  2.3  0.2  ...  0.7  1.4  7.9  12.3 
West 
Germany 
Exports  1.8  ...  0.3  12.8  4.6  7.2  26.6 
Imports  1.8  ...  0.8  11.2  3.2  6.3  23.4 
France 
Exports  0.9  2.4  0.2  8.0  1.7  6.3  17.1 
Imports  1.7  3.6  0.6  10.2  2.1  7.0  21.4 
United 
Kingdom 
Exports  2.8  2.0  0.2  8.6  2.9  6.1  20.6 
Imports  2.5  2.6  1.0  9.3  3.7  4.6  21.1 
Source:  Data  on  exports  and  imports  are  from  International  Monetary  Fund,  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics, 
Yearbook 1983 (IMF,  1983); data on GNP and exchange  rates are from Organization for Economic  Cooperation and 
Development,  OECD Economic  Outlook, no.  34 (Paris: OECD,  1983). 
a.  Components  may not add to totals because  of rounding. 
relatively  small  trade  links that  condition  our conclusions regarding  the 
returns  to coordination.  Table 1 shows a merchandise  trade matrix  for 
major  industrialized  countries  and  the rest of the world.  Incredibly,  total 
U.S. merchandise  exports  to the EC amounted  in 1982  to only 1.6  percent 
of U.S. GNP and 2.2 percent  of EC GNP. Similarly,  U.S. imports  from 
the EC amounted  to 1.4 percent of U.S. GNP and 1.7 percent of EC 
GNP. The simple fact is that although the European economies are 
highly open, fully one half of European  trade remains  within Europe, 
and of the rest, only about 15 percent is with the United States and 4 Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  7 
percent  with Japan.  With  these trade  links, the direct  demand  effects of 
U.S.  stimulus on Germany  or of Germany  on the United States are 
naturally  quite small. A  1 percent increase in U.S.  import demand, 
leading  to a 1 percent  larger  import  volume  from  Germany,  would have 
a direct effect of raising German  GNP by 0.02 percent. In this case, 
indirect  effects on German  export sales of higher  U.S. imports  from  the 
rest of Europe and elsewhere might triple or quadruple  the demand 
effect, but it would still remain rather small. The effects of German 
purchases  on the United States are likely to be far smaller.  A 1 percent 
rise in German  imports  from  the United States amounts  to 0.003  percent 
of U.S. GNP. 
Of course U.S. influences on the rest of the world are much more 
pronounced  than such simple  multiplier  calculations  suggest. The U.S. 
dollar  remains  the linchpin  of the world  monetary  system. As shown in 
table 2, the currency  of denomination  of international  reserves, Euro- 
dollar  loans, new issues of Eurobonds,  and OPEC  portfolio  wealth re- 
mains  to a far higher  extent in U.S. dollars  than  the U.S. share  of world 
GNP would suggest. The special role of the dollar leads to important 
asymmetries  between the effects of U.S. policies on Europe  and  Japan, 
and  the effects of European  and  Japanese  policies on the United States. 
Shifts in the value of the dollar  can have significant  income redistribu- 
tional  effects throughout  the world  that may also have important  aggre- 
gate demand consequences; changes in the value of the European 
currencies  or the Japanese  yen do not have such effects.7  Also, by virtue 
of the dollar's role in world  currency,  it appears  that the United States 
can run high budget and current account deficits without a major 
depreciation  of the dollar,  while in Europe  and Japan,  a similar  level of 
budget  and  external  deficits  would  probably  cause a significant  deprecia- 
tion  of the currency.  Unfortunately,  only some of these asymmetries  are 
well captured  by the macroeconomic  models that  we employ here. 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. In the first we 
present  a two-country  macroeconomic  model  to trace  the  major  channels 
for macroeconomic  policy interdependence.  The goal is to show how 
various  structural  characteristics  determine  the effects of one country's 
7. Of  most  importance  in recent  years,  the sharp  appreciation  of the U.S. dollar  raised 
the real value of the less-developed  countries'  debts to international  commercial  banks 
and  thereby  contributed  to the drop  in LDC imports  from  the OECD  area  in the past two 
years. policies on another;  these characteristics  include  the degree of interna- 
tional asset substitutability  and the extent of wage indexation  in each 
economy. 
With these cross-country channels explained, we describe in the 
second section the logic of macroeconomic  coordination.  Two types of 
equilibriums  are distinguished:  an uncoordinated  policy equilibrium,  in 
which each country selects macroeconomic  policies while taking the 
actions  abroad  as given;  and  a cooperative  equilibrium,  in which  policies 
are a bargained  outcome among the participating  countries. We show 
that  a cooperative  equilibrium  will in general  allow all countries  to reach 
a higher  level of economic welfare. 
In the third  section of the paper,  we use two large-scale  econometric 
models to quantify the gains to a coordinated (or bargained)  policy 
package relative to the uncoordinated  policy settings. Three cases are 
examined  here:  the scope for  coordination  at  the current  macroeconomic 
juncture;  the implications  of a shift  in U.S. policy toward  fiscal  restraint 
and  monetary  ease; and  the role for coordination  in the event of another 
major rise in oil prices. 
In the final  section of the paper  we discuss some of the weaknesses of 
the  analysis  and  some  of the  possible  shortcomings  of the  macroeconomic 
models that we employ. We detail various  ways in which we may have 
understated  or overstated  the benefits  of policy coordination  and point 
out some of the greatest  uncertainties  lurking  in the parameters  of the 
underlying  models. 
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Table 2.  The Role of the U.S.  Dollar in International Finance 
Percent  in U.S.  dollars 
Measure  1975  1978  1981 
Official  reservesa  79.4  76.9  70.6 
Eurodollar  loansb  73.7  67.6  70.6 
Eurobond  issues  47.2  48.2  80.2 
OPEC  reserves (1975-79)  n.a.  60.0  n.a. 
Addendum 
U.S. share of world GNP  24.3  25.0  n.a. 
Source:  For official  reserves,  Eurodollar loans,  and Eurobond  issues,  Peter B.  Kenen,  "The  Role  of the Dollar 
as an International Currency,"  Occasional  Papers,  13 (New  York: Group of  30,  1983), pp.  17, 25, 28; the estimate 
of OPEC reserves  in dollars is from Organization for Economic  Cooperation and Development,  "Exchange  Rates in 
Interlink" (Paris: OECD,  September  1983), p. 27; the U.S.  share of world GNP is from the World Bank Atlas,  1977 
and 1980 editions. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  For all countries. 
b.  Foreign currency claims on nonresidents  reported by European banks. Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  9 
Macroeconomic  Policy under Floating Exchange Rates 
International  linkages in commodity markets  and financial  markets 
substantially  complicate  the standard  closed-economy  analysis of mac- 
roeconomic policies. The effect of domestic policies on the domestic 
economy ("own-country"  multipliers)  depends  crucially  on the degree 
of capital  mobility  between the home country  and the rest of the world 
and on the substitutability  of home and foreign goods in aggregate 
demand.  The price  effects of various  policies may  be heavily  affected  by 
exchange rate movements in the wake of policy changes. A fiscal 
expansion, for example, may raise output while actually reducing 
inflation  via an appreciation  of the domestic  exchange  rate. To illustrate 
some of the possible effects of openness on policy effectiveness, we 
begin with a simple static model of two economies. Elsewhere we have 
studied dynamic  perfect-foresight  models of economies with the same 
essential structure  described  here, and  the qualitative  conclusions  of the 
static model are the same as those of its more appropriate  dynamic 
counterpart.8  In presenting  the model we list only the behavioral  equa- 
tions for the home economy, with the understanding  that comparable 
equations  hold abroad  (an asterisk  denotes foreign  variables). 
The  domestic  economy  produces  an  output  Q at price  P. Home output 
competes with foreign  output  Q* at price P*. The exchange rate E will 
measure  units of the home currency  per unit  of foreign  currency,  so that 
increases in E imply a depreciation  of the home currency. The real 
exchange  rate  for the home economy is A = EP*IP, and  demand  for the 
home good relative  to the foreign  good will be a rising  function  of A. 
Aggregate  demand  at home is the sum  of private  absorption,  A (equal 
to consumption  plus investment  demand),  government  spending,  G, and 
net exports, X  -  Al: 
(1)  Q = A  +  G + X  -  AI. 
Absorption  is a function  of output  net of taxes, Q -  T, the interest  rate 
at home, i, and the private sector's wealth, W. In particular,  A  = 
8. See Jeffrey  Sachs and Charles  Wyplosz, "Real Exchange  Rate Effects of Fiscal 
Policy," Working  Paper 1255  (National  Bureau  of Economic Research,  January  1984), 
and  Sachs  and  Wyplosz,  "La Politique  Budgetaire  et le Taux  de Change  Reel," in  Annales 
de L'INSEE,  vol. 53 (January-March  1984),  pp. 63-91. 10  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
(1 -  s)(Q  -  1)  -  vi +  6w,  where s is the marginal propensity to save 
out of current  disposable income and 8 is the marginal  propensity to 
consume out of financial  wealth. Real private  wealth, W, is the sum of 
the real value of home bonds, B,  and foreign bonds, B*,  held by the 
domestic  private sector.  Let b =  B/P and b* =  B*IP*. Then W =  B/P 
+ EB*/P  = b +  Ab*. 
Private  absorption  is divided  between home goods, CH, and imports, 
so that  A =  CH + AIP,  where  IP  is private-sector  imports.  In particular, 
F  =  ([A)A-P, where [ is the marginal  propensity  to import  out of total 
absorption  and p is the real exchange rate elasticity of import  demand. 
The government  is assumed  to import  with a constant  marginal  propen- 
sity riG. Thus, AIG  =  iGG. The total value of imports  is therefore  A(IF 
+  IG), which equals ([A)A1-P +  [iGG.  Similarly, exports, X, equal 
([*A*)Ap*  +  ",G* AG*. 
Next, we turn  to aggregate  supply  and  price  level determination.  The 
consumer  price level, Pc, is a geometrically  weighted average  of home 
and foreign goods prices, with PC  =  PK  (P*E)(l  -  K).  Denoting the loga- 
rithms  of upper-case  price  variables  by lower-case  variables,  we have: 
(2)  Pc =  Kp  +  ( I  -  K)(e  +  p*). 
Note as well that  p, may be written  as p,  = p  +  (1 -  K)X,  where X = 
log(A). Thus, a real-exchange-rate  depreciation  raises consumer  prices 
at a given level of domestic prices. The (log) wage is a function of the 
consumer  price  level and  the output  level: 
(3)  w =  otpc  + yQ. 
Domestic prices are taken  to be a fixed markup  over domestic  wages, so 
that 
(4)  p =w. 
The model is completed by specifying  the asset market  equilibrium 
conditions.  First,  demand for (log) real money  balances  m  -  p  is  a 
function  of output  and nominal  interest  rates in a standard  equation  for 
the transactions  demand  for money: 
(5)  m -  p  = pQ-  i. 
The bond market  equilibrium  conditions are particularly  important 
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their  portfolios  between home and  foreign  bonds  based on relative  rates 
of return  of the two assets. For simplicity  we assume  that  wealth  holders 
at home and  abroad  have identical  portfolio  preferences  and  thus divide 
their wealth between home and foreign bonds in proportions  e  and 
(1 -  4) with an adjustment according to relative rates of return. With 
static  expectations  the rates  of return  differ  by i -  i*, and  world  demand 
for the home asset is written  as 
(6)  bT =  4(W +  AW*) +  u(i  -  i*). 
Here, bT is the real  total government  debt outstanding,  which is divided 
between home, b, and foreign  holdings, bf, and oa  is the degree of asset 
substitutability.  A crucial  asymmetry  between the United States and all 
other countries  in the world involves the parameter  i.  The U.S. dollar 
is the preeminent  international  asset, and we have cited evidence to 
show that this preeminent  role has remained  despite the declining  U.S. 
share  of the world  real  economy. The presumption  therefore  is that aus 
>>  4 OECD, where 4OECD iS the marginal  propensity  to hold wealth  in the 
currencies  of the other OECD  economies. We shall see shortly  that the 
size of e  has strong  implications  for the impact  of fiscal  policy. 
In  a dynamic  model,  the supply  of bonds  bTwould  equal  the  cumulation 
of government deficits through  time, net of changes in central bank 
holdings  of the public  debt. In this static model, we simply  assume that 
initial  outstanding  debt is zero, so that  bT equals G -  T, the contempo- 
raneous government  deficit. Similarly,  household wealth would equal 
the cumulation  of private  savings, adjusted  for capital  gains  and losses. 
Here,  we set  W equal to contemporaneous  private saving Q -  T -  A 
(see  the Sachs and Wyplosz papers cited in note 8 for the corre- 
sponding equations in  a  dynamic setting).  Note  that  under our 
assumptions,  W +  AW* equals (Q-  T-A)  +  A(Q* -  T* -A*),  which in 
turn equals bT +  Ab*T. 
The  full  model  is shown  in  table  3 (with  only home-country  equations). 
The trade equations and the bond market  equilibrium  condition have 
been linearized  around  an initial  equilibrium  of X =  0 (that is, A =  1) 
and b*T  =  0. The import  demand  equation  I  =  (1iA)A-P +  ,iGG/A be- 
comes I  =  -  (pLAo +  ,iGGo)X +  VA +  jiGG. The export demand equa- 
tion X  =  ([*A*)AP*  +  [LG*AG* becomes  X  =  (p*[*A*  +  LG*Go*)X + 
>*A*  +  iG*G*.  Last,  the  trade  balance  X  -  AI  becomes  TB  = 12  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 3.  The Two-Country Model 
Equationsa 
Demand 
Aggregate demand  Q  =  A  +  G  +  NX 
Net  exports  NX  =  X  -  Al 
Absorption  A  =  (1 -  s)(Q - I)  -  vi  +  8W 
Real private wealth  W =  Q  -  T -  A 
Export  demand  X =  (p*[f*A* +  [G*  Go) A +  [.*A*  +  p,G*G* 
Import demand  I  =  -  (ppAo  +  pLGGo) X +  pA  +  pLGG 
Prices 
Real exchange  rate  A =  p*  +  e  -  p 
Price level (home good)  p  =  w 
Wage level  w  =  cxpc  +  yQ 
Consumer  price level  Pc  =  Kp  +  (1 -  K)(p*  + e) 
Asset markets 
Money  demand  m -  p  =  (pQ -  p3i 
Domestic bond supply  bT =  G  -  T 
Bond market  equilibrium  i -  i* =  [(1  -  4)bT  -  4b*T](l1k) 
Definitionsa 
A  Absorption  of the private  sector  p  log (Home price) 
bT  Stock of domestic bonds  p.  log (Consumer  price) 
e  log (Nominal  exchange rate)  Q  Output 
G  Fiscal expenditure  in home goods  T  Taxes 
units  W  Real wealth 
I  Import  demand  w  log (Nominal  wage) 
i  Interest  rate  X  Export  demand 
m  log (Money demand)  A  Real exchange  rate 
NX  Net exports in home goods units  A  log (Real exchange  rate) 
a.  Equations  apply to the home  country.  Asterisks  denote  foreign-country  variables.  Symmetric  equations  apply 
to the foreign country. 
[p*F*A  *  +  FIG*G*  -  (1  -  p)pAo]X  +  (>*A*  -  pA)  +  (IG*G*  - 
FGG). The term [p*  *A*  +  [iG*G*  -  (1 -  p)[LAo]  is the partial effect of 
A on TB and is hereafter  denoted  E. For [*A*  =  pAo  and G* =  0, the 
term  is positive  if and  only if p + p*  > 1, which  is the traditional  Marshall- 
Lerner  condition  for the effectiveness of a devaluation.  Most empirical 
studies suggest  that a  TB/ax  is negative  over a short  horizon  (six months) 
following  a devaluation  but is positive afterward  as trade  volumes adjust 
to relative price changes. We ignore this so-called J-curve effect and 
hereafter  assume  E >  0.9 
9.  In the EPA  model  and  the MCM,  which  we use later  in the paper,  the J-curve  effect 
is typically  eliminated  in one to three  quarters,  and  in spite  of a current  account  worsening 
on impact,  an exchange  rate  depreciation  is typically  expansionary  on impact. The short-run  effects of a bond-financed  fiscal expansion (dG >  0, 
dT =  0) and a monetary  expansion (dm > 0) are shown in table 4. For 
each set of policies, three cases are compared. First, we have the 
standard Mundell-Fleming  assumptions of  fixed prices (that is,  no 
contemporaneous  indexing)  with perfect or zero asset substitutability. 
Second, we assume full foreign indexation (ox*  =  1, y* >  0) but still 
maintain  fixed prices domestically.  Third,  we consider  the inverse case 
of full domestic indexation  and  fixed  foreign  prices. 
Monetary expansion is the easiest policy to consider. For ox  <  1, 
output and consumer prices necessarily rise. The nominal and real 
exchange  rate depreciate.  The well-known  lesson with regard  to index- 
ation is that a rise in indexation  (higher  ox)  reduces the output  gain and 
increases the price consequences of the monetary expansion. In the 
extreme case where ox  =  1, the monetary  expansion raises prices and 
the nominal  exchange  rate  in equiproportion  (keeping  the real exchange 
rate constant)  and has no effect on the output  level at home or abroad. 
In effect, constant real wages prevent a depreciation  of the home real 
exchange  rate. 
For the foreign  country, the degree of wage indexation  ox*  is crucial 
to the effects of a rise in m. In the Mundell-Fleming  model, with cx*  = 0, 
a home monetary  expansion  reduces  foreign  income and  foreign  prices. 
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Table  4.  Policy  Multipliers  in the Two-Country  Modela 
Monetary  policy  Fiscal policy 
dQ  dX  dpc  dQ*  dp*  dNX  dQ  dX  dpc  dQ*  dp*  dNX 
dm  dm  dm  dm  dm  dm  dG  dG  dG  dG  dG  dG 
Fixed 
pricesb 
cr=0  +  +  +  -  -  +  +  +  +  -  -  + 
cr =  0  +  +  +  -  -  +  +  _  _  +  +  - 
Foreign 
indexationc 
cr=  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
cr =  ?  +  +  +  ?  +  +  +  +  +  +  + 
Domestic 
indexationd 
cr=0  0  0  1  0  0  0  -  +  ?  -  -  + 
=  0  0  1  0  0  0  +  -  +  +  +  - 
Source:  Derived  from equations  in the text; detailed  calculations  available from the authors. 
a. See definitions  of variables  in table  3 and equation  3; (u  denotes  asset substitutability. 
b.  a  =  ao  =  =  *  =  0. 
c.  ot  =  y  =  0;  a*  =  1,  y*  >  0. 
d.  =  y=  0; a  =  1, y > 0. 14  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
This is the traditional  beggar-thy-neighbor  interpretation  of flexible 
exchange  rates. The home  expansion  causes the domestic  exchange  rate 
to depreciate,  shifting  demand  from  foreign  to domestic  goods. Foreign 
demand  drops  and  output  falls. At the same  time, the home depreciation 
reduces  the other  country's  import  prices,  and  thus  the  foreign  consumer 
price index. In summary,  dQ*Idm  < 0 and dpc*dm  <  0. In this view, 
tight  monetary  policies in the United States should  be expected to raise 
European  output  and  prices via the appreciation  of the dollar. 
Once we allow the foreign CPI to feed back into w* and p*, the 
simplicity of the first story is lost; now, a home monetary  expansion 
helps to slow foreign  wage and  price  inflation  via the change  in currency 
values, and the real  depreciation  of the home currency  is diminished. 
With  prices fixed, a change in e changes  p* +  e  -  p in equal amount. 
With  foreign  wage indexing,  however, a rise in e now causes p* to fall, 
so that  the foreign  country's  competitive  loss (which  is measured  by the 
rise in  p* +  e  -  p) is diminished.  Meanwhile,  the foreign  country  enjoys 
the expansionary  demand  effects of lower world interest  rates brought 
about by the home monetary  expansion. Formal  analysis leads to the 
following  conclusions  in the static model. When  ox*  is low, dQ*Idm  < 0; 
when ox*  is near 1.0, dQ*Idm  > 0. In fact there  exists a threshold  degree 
of indexing, c*,  such that dQ*Idm > 0 if and only if ox*> cx*. Moreover, 
if y* is small, then for all ox*,  dp*Idm  <  0. Thus, with very high wage 
indexation  in Europe, a restrictive  U.S. monetary  policy might  actually 
raise prices and  lower output  abroad  and  thus  be a stagflationary  shock. 
Fiscal policy effects are more subtle than monetary  policy effects, 
since the degree of asset substitutability  now plays an important  role. 
When a  = oo,  then the own-country  effects of a fiscal expansion are to 
raise output and appreciate  the currency.  Prices may rise or fall, since 
on the one hand  higher  output  tends to raise prices in the amount  ydQ, 
while on the other hand currency appreciation  reduces import prices 
and the CPI. With indexation, the reduction in import prices feeds 
through  to domestic  wages and  prices. 
The effect on foreign output and prices is ambiguous, depending 
heavily  on the extent of foreign  wage indexation.  When  (x*  = 0, as in the 
traditional  Mundell-Fleming  model, then dQ*IdG  > 0, and dpC*dG  > 0: 
the domestic expansion  raises foreign  output  and prices. The reason is 
straightforward.  The home currency appreciation causes aggregate 
demand  to shift toward  the foreign  good. The expansion "spills over" Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  15 
to foreign output. Foreign  prices rise for two reasons: the direct effect 
of Q*  and  the  impact  of the domestic  appreciation  on the  foreign  country's 
import prices. When o* is large, it might well be that dQ*IdG  <  0. 
Without indexing, the domestic nominal appreciation  causes a real 
appreciation,  and a shift in demand  abroad.  With  indexing,  the nominal 
appreciation  causes foreign  wages to rise when import  prices increase. 
As e falls, p* rises, so that  p* + e  -  p changes  little. Thus, the rise in G 
does not cause as much (or any) real exchange rate appreciation,  and 
demand  does not shift  to the  foreign  country.  Meanwhile,  higher  G  raises 
world interest rates, depressing foreign demand. On balance, if the 
contractionary  interest rate effect is dominant,  dQ*IdG  < 0. Since pc* 
will  tend  to rise  because  of the  home  nominal  exchange  rate  appreciation, 
we may see dQ*IdG  <  0 and dp*IdG  >  0. In this case, a U.S.  fiscal 
expansion  would  be a stagflationary  shock to the European  economies. 
Once we allow for imperfect asset substitutability,  most of these 
effects can be reversed. A fiscal expansion  causes the risk premium  on 
home assets to rise because the increase  in bT relative  to b*T leads to an 
ex ante excess supply of domestic bonds. The partial  effect of a rise in 
bT is twofold. As portfolio holders attempt to shift from domestic to 
foreign  assets at the initial  levels of the exchange  rate  and  interest  rates, 
domestic  bond  prices  are  driven  down  and  foreign  bond  prices  are  driven 
up, so that i -  i* rises. Also, the shift toward  foreign  bonds causes the 
exchange rate to depreciate, which helps restore portfolio  equilibrium 
for two reasons. First, the domestic depreciation  reduces the share of 
portfolio  wealth devoted to home assets (which  were initially  in excess 
supply); second, the depreciation  raises the expectation of a future 
appreciation  of the home currency,  increasing  the demand  for the home 
asset. 
These partial  effects of the portfolio  shift can be added  to the effects 
of fiscal policy under perfect asset substitutability  to find the overall 
effect of a fiscal expansion when a <  oo.  On the one hand, the fiscal 
expansion  raises demand  for home goods and  thereby  tends to cause an 
appreciation;  on the other hand, the rise in bT causes i to rise, reduces 
the demand  effect, and  tends to cause a depreciation.  In fact, the sum  of 
the effects is ambiguous.  The greater  is a, the more likely is an output 
expansion  and  currency  appreciation;  the smaller  is a, the more  likely is 
a contraction  (due to rising  interest  rates) and a currency  depreciation 
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shift in foreign  bonds). The depreciation  and contraction  do not neces- 
sarily go hand in hand. For reasonable parameter  values, the fiscal 
expansion  can  raise  output  while  simultaneously  inducing  a depreciation. 
The  slope  of the  LM  curve  (1p/1)  is another  determinant  of the  exchange 
rate effect of fiscal expansion. When 1p/1  is large  (that  is, the LM curve 
is steep), the fiscal expansion necessitates a large rise in i in order to 
equate  money supply  and  demand  at the initial  exchange  rate. The large 
increase  in i needed to clear the money market  contributes  to an excess 
demand for home bonds, which tends to cause a capital inflow and 
exchange  rate  appreciation. 
The implications  of low a for cross-country  multipliers  are similarly 
ambiguous.  When ox*  is very low (so that nominal  wages are rigid),  the 
absence of high capital  mobility  can make dQ*IdG  turn  negative. With 
low a, the home currency  depreciates,  and  demand  no longer  spills over 
to the other  country.  Although  foreign  interest  rates  fall, because of the 
portfolio  shift towards  b*T,  the expansionary  effects of the decline in i* 
are smaller  than the demand  effects of the home country  depreciation. 
When ox*  is high (so that real wages are rigid),  then the home country's 
nominal  depreciation  does not have much effect on the real exchange 
rate. As e  rises, p* falls, so that p*  +  e  -  p remains substantially 
unchanged.  Then, the foreign country does not lose much in external 
competitiveness, but it gains by the reduction  in interest rates. In this 
case, dQ*IdG  is more  likely to be positive. 
It  is important  to note  that  the  higher  is the  world's  marginal  propensity 
to hold domestic bonds out of wealth (e), the more likely is a currency 
appreciation  following a fiscal expansion. At initial interest rates and 
exchange rate, a rise in b causes supply  of home bonds to rise by b and 
demand to  rise  by  4b.  Thus, the  excess  supply of  home bonds 
is (1  -  a)b, and the interest rate differential,  i  -  i*, must rise by 
(1/a)(1  -  i)b.  Evidently,  the larger is  4,  the smaller is the necessary 
increase  in the interest  rate  differential,  and  the more  likely is a currency 
appreciation  following  a fiscal  expansion.  The fact that  e  is large  for the 
United States and small for all other major  currencies  is an important 
factor  in explaining  why a U.S. fiscal expansion  tends to strengthen  the 
dollar  while a similar  expansion  in France,  West Germany,  Japan,  or the 
United Kingdom  is perceived  to weaken  the currency.  We return  to this 
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SOME  LONG-RUN  EFFECTS  OF  MACROECONOMIC  POLICIES 
Long-run  effects of monetary  and  fiscal  policy  may  differ  substantially 
from  the short-run  effects. First, in the long run,  prices adjust  to restore 
full  employment,  so that  all  long-run  demand  effects of m, G, and T  show 
in prices rather  than output. But less obvious, permanent  changes in G 
and T lead to long-run changes in the economy's net international 
investment  position, and therefore  in the long-run  real exchange rate. 
Interestingly,  these long-run  effects can move in the direction  opposite 
to that  of the short-run  effects. 
To discuss this issue, we must be clear on the meaning  of "long- 
run"  policies. First, we redefine  bT, G, and T  to be in units  per potential 
GNP, which is assumed  to grow at the exogenous rate  n. The evolution 
of public debt now is governed by bT+  1 =  (1  +  r -  n)bfT +  (G  -  1). 
Assuming  that real interest  rates, r, exceed an economy's trend  growth 
rate, n, then a permanent  rise in G for given  T is not feasible. If G is 
raised  permanently  above To  (with  b  T =  0), then bT  would  grow without 
bound. Eventually government debt servicing alone would exceed 
national  product.  The government's  long-run  budget  constraint  requires 
that bT  remain  bounded. One feasible policy, which we study here, is a 
choice of Gt  and T,  such  that  the deficit  relative  to potential  GNP remains 
constant  at some level. 
A fixea deficit, G + rbT  -  T, leads to a steady-state  debt/GNP  ratio 
of (lIn)(G  +  rbT -  7). For an economy growing  at 3 percent  per year, 
for example, a permanent  rise in the deficit of 1 percent of GNP (for 
given r) leads to a steady-state increase of bT of (0.01/0.03) =  1/3 (for 
example,  a rise in the debt/GNP  ratio  from  0.0 to 0.33). Of course, many 
combinations  of G and T can stabilize the deficit at a particular  level. 
The policy that  we study  is one in which G is permanently  raised  at time 
zero by dG, and taxes are thereafter  adjusted  in line with rising debt 
servicing  so that  the overall  deficit  relative  to GNP  remains  permanently 
higher  by the amount  dG.  Moreover,  to keep  the story  simple,  we assume 
that  the real  interest  rate  is fixed  (for  example,  determined  from  abroad). 
(A rise in r after the fiscal expansion  would merely amplify  the results 
that we find below.) Then the change in taxes, dT, follows the path of 
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(7)  dTt =  rdbT. 
When  G rises, taxes are initially  unchanged.  As debt  accumulates,  taxes 
are raised to  service the increased debt payments. Long-run debt 
obligations  rise in the amount  (1In)dG,  so that in the long run  taxes rise 
in the amount rln. Assuming, as we do, that r >  n,  then dTIdG = 
rln >  1. Eventually, taxes rise by more than dG, even though the 
government  deficit  is maintained  forever.  It is easy to show that  private- 
sector financial  wealth  falls, in the steady state, as follows.  10 
(8)  dW =  -  [(srln)I(8 -  r +  n)]dG < 0. 
The rest of the world ends up holding the entire increase in national 
government  debt, and then some, since private-sector  holdings  of debt 
actually drop. In the long run, the home economy must run trade 
surpluses  to service this increase  in debt held abroad. 
Because of the rise in taxes and  the fall in wealth, private  spending  A 
falls by more  than  the rise in G:I  1 
(9)  dA =  [(rln)I(8 -  r +  n)][(8 -  r +  n) +  s(r -  n)](-  dG) <  -dG. 
The rise in G raises aggregate  demand  for the home good in the amount 
(1  -  [iG)dG. On the other hand, domestic private spending  on home 
goods falls by (1 -  [)dA.  The real exchange rate must depreciate in 
the long run to raise demand  for home goods as long as [(1 -  [)dA  + 
(1 -  FGP)dG]  is negative. More  precisely, 
(10)  dX =  -  (l/E)[(1 -  V)dA  +  (1 -  jfG)dG]. 
For  L  -  FG, there is a long-run  real depreciation,  while for  L?  >>  G, A 
will  appreciate.12 
10. A =  (1 -  s) (Q -  T) -  vr +  6W, and W =  (1 +  r -  n) W +  Q -  T -  A. With  Q 
and  r fixed, we can solve for dW  as a function  of dT: dW =  -  [sl(8 -  r +  n)] dT. Since 
dT = (rln)dG,  we arrive  at equation  8 in the text. 
11.  SinceA  = (1 -  s)(Q  -  T) -  vr +  8W,dA  =  -(1  -  s)dT+  MdW.  Now substitute 
dT = (rln)dG  and  equation  8 to arrive  at equation  9. 
12. The fiscal  expansion  has two effects: reducing  aggregate  domestic  absorption  and 
shifting  the structure  of absorption  between  home and  foreign  goods. The fall in A tends 
to cause a long-run  depreciation.  A shift in the structure  of absorption  toward  the home 
good  tends  to cause  an  appreciation.  When  [L =  fG,  only  the absorption  effect is operative, 
because the marginal  propensities  to import  of the private  and public  sectors are equal. 
Therefore,  when pL  =  pLG, there  must  be a long-run  depreciation.  For 11  >  FG  there  may  be 
an appreciation,  because  the fiscal  expansion  serves  to shift  demand  toward  home  goods. 
See Sachs  and  Wyplosz, "Real  Exchange  Rate  Effects." Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  19 
In  this  context, then, consider  the effects of sustaining  the U.S. budget 
deficits  for a prolonged  period into the future, holding  the deficit/GNP 
ratio constant, and taking the optimistic case that real interest rates 
remain  constant. As interest payments on the debt mount, taxes will 
have to be raised merely to service the debt. As taxes rise, domestic 
absorption  will fall, and eventually  the fall in A must exceed the rise in 
G. As long as  L  -  AG,  the net effect of falling  A and rising  G will be an 
excess supply  of U.S. goods. A real  exchange  rate  depreciation  will then 
be necessary to maintain  demand  equal  to output.  Thus, while the fiscal 
expansion  appreciates  the dollar  in the short  run,  it depreciates  the dollar 
in the long run. 
EVIDENCE  ON  POLICY  MULTIPLIERS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WEST  GERMANY,  AND  JAPAN 
We have seen that the magnitude  of effects of monetary  and fiscal 
policies on home and foreign  variables  depends on several parameters 
such as those measuring  the degree of asset substitutability,  the wage 
responsiveness to price changes, and the interest elasticity of money 
demand.  It is beyond our capacity  in this paper  to provide  independent 
evidence on each of these variables. Instead we rely heavily on the 
evidence contained in several large-scale multicountry  models. The 
major conclusions from this evidence are as follows: (1) monetary 
expansion  causes a much  larger  depreciation  of the currency  than does 
fiscal expansion per unit of GNP increase; (2) the United States is the 
only large country that shows a systematic tendency toward  currency 
appreciation  following  a bond-financed  fiscal  expansion;  (3)  fiscal  expan- 
sion has a smaller  effect on prices than does monetary  expansion per 
unit of GNP increase as a result of their differential  impact on the 
exchange rate; and (4) fiscal expansion has a larger  effect on current 
account  deficits  than  does monetary  expansion  per  unit  of GNP  increase, 
also as a result  of the differential  effects on the exchange  rate. 
The normalized  own- and  cross-country  multipliers  for monetary  and 
fiscal  policy are shown in table 5 (for  the MCM)  and  table  6 (for  the EPA 
model). The policies are scaled to produce  one unit of GNP increase in 
the expanding  country. The multipliers  are measured  as averages  for a 
two-year  period:  GNP is measured  as a percentage  deviation  from the 
baseline;  inflation  is the percentage-point  increase relative to baseline; U  t  >  Bo  o  o  D  o~~~~  o  o 
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and the current-account/GNP  ratio (current  account ratio)  is measured 
as an absolute difference  from the baseline. The monetary  policy is a 
percentage-point  reduction  in the central bank discount rate, and the 
fiscal  policy is an increase  of 1 percent  of GNP in fiscal expenditures  on 
goods and services. For the fiscal expansion, the monetary stance is 
characterized  by an unchanged  money base. In table  5, for example, we 
see that a 3.64 percentage  point cut in the U.S. discount  rate, sustained 
for two years, is estimated  to raise U.S. GNP by 1 percent, raise U.S. 
inflation  by 0.18 percentage  points, and lower the U.S. current  account 
share  of GNP by 0.02 percent, all averaged  over two years. 
Examining  first the own-country  effects of monetary  policy, we see 
that monetary policy is more inflationary  than fiscal policy, and with 
only one exception  (Japan,  in the MCM),  fiscal  policy  has a considerably 
larger  effect on external  deficits  than  does monetary  policy. The models 
also all show that  a monetary  expansion  causes a current  account  deficit. 
This  finding  will  prove  important  in  our  discussion  of policy  coordination. 
These differing  effects of M (monetary  policy) and G (fiscal policy) 
work in large  part  through  the exchange  rate. The normalized  exchange 
rate multipliers  for the MCM  and the EPA and OECD  Interlink  models 
are shown  in table  7. In  every case, a monetary  expansion  causes a larger 
depreciation  than  does a fiscal expansion.  The United States stands  out 
as the only country with a tendency toward appreciation  following a 
fiscal expansion. According  to descriptions  of the models, this asym- 
metry has two causes, and they are in line with our earlier  discussion. 
First, all of the models incorporate  an asymmetry  in portfolio  composi- 
tion that gives a high marginal  propensity  to hold U.S. dollars out of 
financial  wealth. Second, the econometric estimates of the monetary 
system all find  a more steeply sloped LM curve (that  is, a lower interest 
elasticity of money demand)  in the United States than elsewhere. We 
saw earlier that an inelastic demand for money favors a currency 
appreciation  following  a fiscal  expansion. 
The differential  impact of M and G on inflation  (-r) and the current 
account ratio (CA) suggests how different  mixes of policy can achieve 
various targets among output (Q), inflation, and external balance. 
Suppose  that Q =  M  +  G, -n =  mnM  +  g1G, and CA =  m2M  +  g2G, 
with ml >  g1 >  0, and g2 <  m2 <  0. If the goal is to change inflation  by 
zA-rr  <  0 without reducing  output, it can be brought  about by a fiscal 
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Table  7. Normalized  Policy  Multipliers  for the Exchange  Rate in the Economic 
Planning  Agency,  Multicountry,  and Interlink  Modelsa 
Economic  Planning 
Country  Agency model  Multicountry  model  Interlink  model 
acting, and  Size of  Exchange  Size of  Exchange  Size of  Exchange 
policy  policy  rate effect  policy  rate effect  policy  rate effect 
United  States 
Monetary  4.08  -  1.84  3.64  -  1.91  8.00  --4.80 
Fiscal  0.48  - 0.02  0.83  0.49  0.64  0.29 
Japan 
Monetary  2.50  -6.82  2.67  -  1.07  6.67  -5.00 
Fiscal  0.64  -  1.63  0.71  -0.45  0.59  -0.15 
West  Germany 
Monetary  1.11  - 2.82  4.44  - 4.00  4.00  - 3.30 
Fiscal  0.51  -  1.42  1.03  -  1.17  0.80  -0.02 
Source:  A. Amano,  "Exchange  Rate Simulations: A Comparative Study,"  European Economic Reviewv  (forthcom- 
ing). 
a.  See  table 5, note a. For Japan and Germany,  the exchange  rate is dollars per unit of national currency; for the 
United States,  it is the trade-weighted  effective  exchange  rate. A negative  sign indicates  a depreciation. 
(O  1)  A\M  =  A'/\ (m  I -  g 1)  < ? 
AG =  -?AM> O. 
If the goal is to improve  the trade  balance  without  a loss of output, then 
there should  be a monetary  expansion  with fiscal  contraction: 
(12)  A\M  =  ACA/(m2 -  g2)  >  0 
AG =  -zAM< O. 
This simple  illustration  suggests  that  the Reagan  administration's  mix of 
expansionary  fiscal  policy and  contractionary  monetary  policy, from  the 
U.S. viewpoint  alone, may  make  sense if the principal  targets  are  output 
growth and reduced inflation,  rather  than output growth with current 
account  balance. 
Several systematic conclusions emerge  from the cross-country  mul- 
tipliers. In both the MCM and the EPA model, the short-run  wage 
responsiveness is too low to reverse the Mundell-Fleming  conclusion 
that fiscal policy is positively transmitted.  Similarly,  the cross-country 
effect of monetary  policy is negative  (as in the Mundell-Fleming  model) 
or,  if  positive,  generally  quite  small.  In  all  cases, a foreign  fiscal  expansion 
improves  the home current  account and raises (or leaves unchanged) 
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smaller than occurs with a domestic expansion because the exchange 
rate  consequences  are  generally  better  if the other  country  engineers  the 
expansion. 
The other point about the multipliers  is that while the United States 
has some effect on West Germany  and Japan, the reverse effects are 
somewhat smaller in view  of  the relative sizes  of the economies. 
Naturally, this will make it harder  to interest the United States in a 
coordinated  policy program,  as the following  section shows. 
The Coordination  of Macroeconomic  Policies 
In the absence of competitive  markets,  there is no reason to expect 
that  individuals  will fully exploit their  gains  from  trade.  This conclusion 
is most striking  and obvious in the case of pure  externalities,  where the 
failure  of a market  to exist leads to overproduction  of social harms  (such 
as pollution) or underproduction  of social goods. It is not surprising, 
therefore,  that in the realm  of macroeconomic  policymaking,  where no 
markets  for policies exist, there may be unexploited  opportunities  for 
countries  to "trade"  macroeconomic  policies that could leave all coun- 
tries closer to their  macroeconomic  targets.  The goal of this section is to 
discover  what  it is that  countries  can  offer  each other  in "package  deals" 
that swap macroeconomic  policies. 
Before turning to that question, we  should note an unavoidable 
limitation to our analysis. Once it is recognized that countries have 
policy actions  that  can be offered  to others  in exchange  for policy moves 
from  abroad,  there  is really  no reason  for assuming  that  macroeconomic 
policies must  be swapped  only for macroeconomic  policies, as opposed, 
for example, to trade  or security  concessions. The possibility  of negoti- 
ating  a package  of international  moves and agreements  across a variety 
of fields is beyond our scope. Our focus here is on the gains from 
cooperation  purely  within  the macroeconomic  realm. 
We use the classic Tinbergen  targets-and-instruments  framework,  as 
adapted  to a multicountry  environment  by Niehans, Cooper, and espe- 
cially Hamada.  3 Recent work  in this area  includes  Johansen,  Canzoneri 
13. Jurg  Niehans, "Monetary  and Fiscal Policies in Open Economies under Fixed 
Exchange  Rates:  An Optimizing  Approach,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 76, part 
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and Gray, Miller and Salmon, and Sachs (see note 6). Consider an 
n-country  world economy, where each of the n countries  has m policy 
targets. For country i, call the vector of targets Ti, which equals the 
m-tuple (Ti, Ti,.  .  .,  Tm).  The country has l controls (policy instruments), 
with the vector of controls  Ci =  (Ci, Q, .  .  .,  Cl).  The macro-authorities 
choose Ci  in order  to maximize  a welfare  function Ui(Ti). 
In an interdependent  world, each country's Ti will be a function of 
the control  settings  in all of the countries,  and  of a set of exogenous  varia- 
bles L: 
(13)  Ti = Fi(C1, C2,  .  .  *,  Cn, L). 
In a dynamic setting, Ti will also be  a function of the  "inherited 
conditions" of the world economy in any period, defined by a state 
vector S: 
(14)  Ti = Fi(C', C2, .  .  .,  Cn, S, L). 
In this case, policymakers  will also have to take into account  the effects 
of their actions today on future values of S.  (In dynamic rational 
expectations  models, Ti  will also be a function  of anticipated  levels of C 
and  L in the future.) 
To formalize  the idea of unexploited  gains from trade, we describe 
uncoordinated  policymaking  as a situation  in  which  each  country  chooses 
its policy instruments  while taking  as given the actions selected in the 
other  n -  1 countries.  Thus, in this case, no attempt  is made  to trade  off 
an action  at home  for an action  abroad,  because all of the actions abroad 
are assumed  to be given. This so-called Nash equilibrium  is formalized 
as follows. A Nash equilibrium  is an n-tuple  (C1N, C2N,  .  .  .,  CnN) such 
that for all countries i, CiN maximizes Ui(Ti)  with respect to Ci, given 
that 
Ti =  Fi(CIN,  C2N  ,  C(i- I)N,  Ci,  C(i+ l)N,  ...  ., Cn]V). 
This formulation  of each country's problem assumes away one very 
basic reason  for international  cooperation:  the exchange  of information. 
ment  in Interdependent  Economies," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  vol. 83 (February 
1969),  pp. 1-24; and Hamada,  "Alternative  Exchange  Rate Systems" and "A Strategic 
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In a Nash equilibrium,  every country  knows exactly what every other 
country  is doing, and  all policymakers  agree  on the "true" model. Even 
opponents of active international  policy coordination  generally  recog- 
nize the need for the international  exchange of information  on policy 
choices. 
The important  fact about  a Nash equilibrium  is that  it is rarely  efficient 
(or  Pareto  optimal),  in the sense that  at least some countries  can be made 
better  off without  any countries  being made  worse off by an alternative 
choice of policy instruments.  This fact can be most simply  illustrated  in 
the two-economy case where each economy has a single policy instru- 
ment. When the foreign  country (country  2) chooses its optimal  policy 
C2, it sets aU2/aC2  =  0. However, for the home country, aU1/aC2 will 
generally not equal zero. Then, a change in C2 can (to a first-order 
approximation)  leave foreign  welfare  unchanged  while raising  utility at 
home. Consider  a change in policy mix dC2 =  W(aU1/aC2),  where w is a 
small  positive number.  We calculate  the resulting  changes  in Ul and U2, 
to a first  order, as dU1 =  (aU1/aC2)dC2  and dU2 =  (aU2/dC2)dC2.  Thus 
with dC2 =  w(aU1/dC2),  we see that dU1 =  W(aU1/aC2)2  while dU2 =  0 
(since aU2/aC2 equals 0). Since we can make the same calculation  for 
the home country's policy, it is easy to see that a change in dC1 = 
W(aU2/aC1)  and dC2 =  W(aU1/aC2)  will leave both countries better off 
than  in the Nash, noncooperative  equilibrium. 
It should be noted that when C2  is perturbed,  thereby  raising  Ul and 
leaving U2 unchanged  to a first  order,  foreign  utility  U2 is in fact reduced 
to a second order. This is because, to a second-order  approximation, 
dU2 =  (aU2/aC2)dC2  +  ?/2[a2(U2)/(aC2)2](dC2)2,  and at the original  Nash 
equilibrium  [a2(U2)/(aC2)2]  <  0. This explains why country 2 cannot 
simply do country 1 a "favor" by perturbing  C2. Country  1 gains a lot, 
but country 2 still does lose a little. Only a joint policy of dC1  and dC2 
gives both countries  a first-order  welfare  improvement. 
A simple diagram  can help to clarify  the argument  for coordination. 
In figure  1, we draw  the indifference  curves for countries 1  and 2 in (Cl, 
C2) space. The figure  is drawn  under  the assumption  that a U2/aCl  and 
aU1/aC2 are both positive. At the Nash equilibrium,  N, C1  is chosen to 
maximize  Ul given C2N, so that  the indifference  curve for 1  is horizontal 
at N (that is,  aU1/aCl =  0); similarly  the indifference  curve for 2 is 
vertical  at N. Now, when C' is changed  in the direction  W(aU2/aCI),  the 
domestic  control  is moved by the vector dCO  . For small  changes, d  Ul  ' Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  27 
Figure 1.  The Geometry of Policy Coordination 
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O  and dU2 > 0 (actually, Ul falls by a second-order  term, while U2 rises 
by a first-order  term).  The vertical  vector in the figure  represents  dC2. A 
small  rise in C2  leads to dU' > 0 and  dU2  0  O.  A cooperative  equilibrium 
would be given by a sum of vectors dC1  and dC2,  shown as the upward- 
sloping  vector at point N. It clearly  moves into a region  of joint welfare 
improvement.  The region  between the two indifference  curves U' and 
UIN  describes the entire set of policy moves that are Pareto improving 
vis-a-vis N. Note that at point E, the indifference  curves of 1 and 2 are 
tangent.  As we shall  note momentarily,  no movement  of Cl and C2 from 
E can be Pareto  improving,  so E is an efficient  policy equilibrium. 
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policies  leave cross-country  policy  effects  like aUl/laC? nonzero,  while 
own-country policy effects are set to zero. Let us look at aUll/C?  more 
closely  to  see  the  particular circumstances  in  which  aUl/laC?  might 
(inadvertently)  be equal to zero. In fact aU1/laC?  =  (aU1/aT1)(aT1/aC?). 
That is, the effect of Ci  on Ul is given by the effects of Ci  on the targets 
in country 1, multiplied  by the marginal  welfare effects of T1  on Ul. 
There  are three  major  ways in which this total effect may be zero. Most 
directly, aT'/aC?  might  equal zero because there is no effect of country 
2's policies on the foreign target variables. The economies are simply 
decoupled,  at least for that  policy instrument. 
Second, the effects of Ci  on 7P  might  be the same as the effects of a 
linear combination  of country l's own controls on its own targets, so 
that aT1/aC? =  EL= Xi(aT1/aC). In this case, country 1 can undo any 
effects of C2 on its targets. Since in its own optimization  program  it sets 
(aU1/aTD)(aT1/aC) =  0 for  i  =  1,  .  .  .,  1, we  see  immediately  that 
(aU1/aT1)(aT1/aC?)  =  El=  Xi(aU1/aT1)(aT1/aCQ)  =  0.  This  is  a crucial 
point: the inefficiency  of uncoordinated  policymaking  arises not from 
the mere fact of interdependence,  but because one country's policies 
affect another's targets in a way that is (linearly)  distinct from that 
country's  abilities  to affect its own targets. 
The third, and least interesting way,  that aUl/laC? may equal zero is 
that  country 1 has, on its own, enough  policy instruments  to reach  all of 
its targets. Define the "bliss" point for country 1 as the m-tuple T  - 
A  A  AA 
(TI, TI, .  .,  T ) such that U(TI) >  U(TI) for all other possible values of 
the targets.  At the bliss point, a  UV/WT  = 0 as a property  of an optimum. 
Thus at T,, aU1/laC?  = (aU1/aT1)(aT1/aC)  = 0. If the home country has 
reached  its bliss point, it does not care about small  perturbations  in C2, 
since these will have (at most) second-order  consequences for national 
welfare. 
Perturbation  arguments  at the Nash equilibrium  establish  a direction 
of movement of the policy variables  that leaves both countries better 
off. Such  arguments  do not, however, establish  the distance  that  policies 
should be moved. At what point is a further  coordinated  movement of 
policies futile?  We define  a vector of policies (Cl, C2)  as efficient  if there 
is no Pareto-improving  selection of policies, and we define  CE as the set 
of efficient  policy vectors.  14 
14. Formally,  (C', C2) is efficient  if and only if there does not exist a feasible vector 
(Cl, C2)  such that U'[T'(C,, C2)] 2  U'[T'(C',  C2)] and U2[F(C,,  C2)]  2  U2[F(C',  C2)], with 
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Mathematically,  it is easy to characterize  efficient policy choices, 
since  every  efficient  policy  vector  maximizes  the  weighted  sum  of utilities 
wI  Ul(T1) +  (1 -  wD)U2(p), for some weight  0 ?  w1  ?  1. By maximizing 
this weighted sum with respect to Cl and C2 for all possible weights wl 
and  (1 - wl), we can identify  all efficient  policy packages.  Consider  a set 
of policies that maximizes w1Ul  +  (1  -  w1)U2 for some wl.  At a 
maximum, we know that w1aU1/aCI +  (1  -wD)aU2/laC  =  0. It is now 
easy to verify that at such an equilibrium,  any policy perturbation  that 
raises  U2 must  lower Ul. That  is, all  gains  from  trade  have  been  exploited. 
For small  changes  in Cl we have 
dUl  =  (aUY/aC1)dC! 
=  -  [(1  -  w)/w1]  (aU2/aC!)dC! 
-  -[(1  -  wl)/wl]dU2. 
Thus, for any change in Cl, dUl and dU- necessarily move in opposite 
directions. 
SOME  ILLUSTRATIONS  OF  THE  GAINS  FROM  TRADE 
A major  task of international  economics should be to discover the 
sources of gains from trade  in macroeconomic  policies. In the study of 
real trade theory, for example, economists have long recognized the 
possibility  of mutual  advantage  in  multilateral  tariff  reductions,  but  much 
less thought  and  energy  has so far  gone into  the question  of advantageous 
coordination  in the monetary  and fiscal sphere. In the remainder  of this 
section we offer illustrations  of those gains. Then we turn  to large-scale 
macroeconometric  models to find, via numerical  simulation,  the empir- 
ical importance  of some of these channels. It should be noted at the 
outset that  while an analytical  characterization  of efficient  policies CE is 
difficult  or impossible  for a large-scale  model, a full numerical  treatment 
is relatively  straightforward. 
Let us turn first to a case where interdependence  exists but where 
there  are no gains to cooperation. Suppose inflation  is given by 'r  =  TQ 
and the GNP gap is a function  of domestic monetary  (M) and fiscal (G) 
policies and foreign policies M* and G*: Q =  a1M +  a2G +  a3M* + 
a4G*.  We know from  our  theoretical  work  that  a3  and  a4  may  be positive 
or negative. For our purpose here we assume only that a,  +  a3 > 
O  and a2 + a4>  0, that is, that direct  effects dominate  indirect  effects if 
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and inflation. Domestic utility is a function of the target vector T = 
T(Q,  r),  with  U  =  U(T).  Clearly,  domestic  authorities  will  choose 
M such that (aU/aT)(aT/aM) =  0. Here, aT/aM =  (a,,  a1T).  A change in 
M* will affect utility  as (aU/1T)(aT/aM*),  but since aT/aM*  =  (a3,  a3T)  = 
a3/a1)(aT/aM),  we see that (aU/1T)(aT/1aM*)  =  (a3/al)(aU/aTl)(T/IM)  = 
0. There will be no scope for cooperation. Even if the home country 
could choose M* and G* it would find  it superfluous  to do so, since M* 
and  G*  affect home country  targets  in exactly the same  way as M and  G, 
up to a constant  of proportionality. 
Suppose  now that  the country's  authorities  target  the current  account 
balance  (or changes  in external  indebtedness)  as well as ar  and Q. Now, 
U  =  U(Q,  r, CA). With symmetric countries,  the current balance will 
depend  only  on the differences  M  -  M* and G  -  G*, since  CA*  = 
-  CA. Then, CA =  P1(M -  M*) +  A2(G  -  G*). A fiscal expansion  will 
almost surely worsen the external  balance, so that 2  <  0. A monetary 
expansion, we have noted, tends to improve  CA via currency  deprecia- 
tion, but also to worsen CA via the direct effect demand  expansion. In 
line with the empirical  evidence in tables 5 and 6, we assume 1I <  0. 
Consider  the effects of the controls  on the country  targets: 
Q =  a1M +  a2G  +  a3M*  +  a4G* 
(15)  rr  =  alTM  +  a2TG  +  a3TM*  +  a4TG* 
CA =  13(M  -  M*) +  132(G  -  G*). 
Now,  aT/aM =  (a1,a1T,P1) and aT/aM*  =  (a3,a3T, -  1I). The vectors 
aT/aM  and aT/aM*  are no longer linearly  dependent, thus aU/aM*  will 
be nonzero.  To be more precise:  aU/aM  =  ula1  +  u2a1T  +  U31  =  0, 
where ui =  aU/aTi.  We assume that ul >  0 (more output preferred  to 
less), u2 < 0 (less inflation  preferred  to more), and U3 > 0 (higher  trade 
balance preferred).  Now aU/aM* =  u1a3 +  u2a3T  -  u3A, which upon 
substituting  aU/aM =  0 yields aU/aM*  =  -  [(al  +  a3)/aJ]u3A,  which is 
greater  than  zero. Thus higher  M* raises home welfare. But since at the 
initial  equilibrium  a  U*/aM*  = 0, a slight  rise in M* will raise U without 
changing  (to a first  order)  U*. By symmetric  reasoning,  M can be raised 
at home without  a loss of welfare  while providing  a (first-order)  gain in 
welfare  abroad.  A joint expansion  of M and  M* will therefore  raise both 
U and U*, and  a similar  argument  guarantees  that  ajoint  fiscal  expansion 
is also welfare improving.  In sum, when policymakers  prefer a larger 
trade  surplus,  and  macroeconomic  expansion  worsens  the  trade  balance, Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  31 
there  will be a tendency toward  overcontraction  in the world  economy. 
Geometrically,  the Nash equilibrium  will lie to the lower left of the 
efficient,  symmetric  equilibrium,  as shown in figure  1. 
Now let us refine  the model  further,  to allow  for differential  exchange 
rate effects of monetary  and fiscal policy. With symmetric  economies, 
the real exchange rate will be given as a function of the difference 
between  M and  M* and  the difference  between G and G*: 
(16)  A =  Oc1(M  -  M*) +  cx2(G -  G*)  Oj >0,  OL2  0 
Because a monetary  expansion  depreciates  the real  exchange  rate, cx1  is 
surely positive. With a high substitutability,  u, of home and foreign 
assets,  x2  will be negative, while with u small, X2  will be positive. The 
current  balance and output are written as before. Finally, inflation  is 
written  as a rising  function  of X: 
(17)  Tr  =  TQ +  OX. 
In choosing domestic monetary  policy in the Nash regime,  the home 
authority  will set (aU/aT)(aT/aM)  equal to zero, or u1a1 +  u2(Ta1 +  Ota1) 
+  u3P1  =  0, with ui the partial  derivatives  of U(Q,  ar,  CA). At the Nash 
equilibrium,  (aU/aT)(aT/aM*)  =  u1a3  +  U2(Ta3  -  001)  -  U3A1- Using 
(aU/aT)(aT/aM) = 0, we have (aU/aT)(aT/aM*) =  -(u3A1  + u20c1)[(a1  + 
a3)a  1].  Under the assumptions that (1) a higher trade balance is preferred, 
U3  >  0;  (2) a monetary expansion worsens or has little effect on the 
current  account balance, 1I ?  0; and (3) less inflation  is preferred,  u2 < 
0; then (aU/aT)(aT/aM*)  is positive. That  is, the countries  would  gain  by 
ajoint monetary  reflation. 
Consider  (aU/aT)(aT/aG*). By direct  substitution  this term  equals  u1a4 
+  u2(Ta4 -  Ocx2)  -  U313. At the Nash equilibrium,  0 =  (aU/aT)a(T/aG) = 
u1a2  +  u2(Ta2  + Ocx2)  +  u312, so that 
(aU/aT)(aT/aG*) =  -  (U3P2  + U20t2)[(a2 + a4)/a2]. 
Since a2 Z  0, it appears that (aU1aT)(aT/aG*)  is of ambiguous sign. 
However, as a property  of the Nash equilibrium,  we can show that u3A2 
+  u2OcU2  <  0, so that the sign is positive (assuming,  as before, that u1  > 
0, u2 < 0, and U3  <  0).  Since (aU/aT)(aT/aG*)  is positive, we again  find  a 
tendency  toward  overcontraction,  this time  in fiscal  policy. Ajoint fiscal 
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To show that u3132  +  u2OcU2  <  0,  start with 0  =  (aU/aT)(aT/aM) = 
u1a1  +  u2(Ta1Ta+Oc1) +  u3A1. By  rearrangement,  u1  +  TU2  = 
-(l/a0)(u3P1+u20x1).  Assuming P < 0,  cx1  >  0,  U3 >  0, and u2 < 0, 
we see that u1 +  TU2 >  0. Now  consider 0 =  (aU1a3)(aT/aG) =  ul a1 + 
u2 (Ta2 +  Oc2)  +  u312. We see that U1  +  TU2 =  -(l/a2)(U3P2+U20t2). 
Since a2 >  0 and u1 +  TU2 >  0, we find immediately  that u312  +  u20cX2 
must  be negative, as we wanted  to show. 
Under our specific assumptions, both M and G will tend to be too 
contractionary  at the Nash equilibrium,  so that utility will rise when 
both dG =  dG* > 0 and dM =  dM* > 0.  Under alternative assumptions 
on the signs of u1,  U2, U3; on the policy multipliers;  or on the targets  in 
the objective function, the bias towards overcontraction  can be re- 
versed. Indeed, in cases  where fiscal expansion causes a currency 
appreciation,  and  thus allows an economy to export  its inflation  abroad, 
it is  not difficult to  construct examples where monetary policy is 
overcontractionary  while fiscal policy is overexpansionary,  with the 
overall  mix being  overcontractionary.  To summarize,  an uncoordinated 
selection of macroeconomic  strategies  is likely to lead to an inefficient 
mix of monetary  and fiscal policies and to an inefficient  overall stance 
on the level of output  selected. 
In the empirical  work that follows, we will use a quadratic  utility 
function, since it results in linear policy rules. For example, we will 
specify  U as  -  T  Q)2  +  (r  -  -)2  +  4(CA -  CA)2], where  Q,  *, 
and CA are the targets  (or bliss points) for Q, ar,  and CA. In this case, 
the marginal  utility  of Q,  r,  and  CA  depend  on their  respective  distances 
from  Q, r, TB,  with  u1  =  -(Q  -  Q), U2  =  -  -  ),  U3  =  -(CA  - CA). 
Thus, inflation  will be important  on the margin  when inflation  is very 
high;  the current  account deficit  is important  on the margin  when CA is 
very low relative  to CA;  and so on. 
It is  not hard to  generalize our results to cases  of  asymmetric 
economies. If fiscal expansion  in the United States tends to appreciate 
the dollar while a foreign fiscal expansion depreciates the foreign 
currency, then it is possible that a U.S.  fiscal contraction  will lower 
foreign utility while a foreign fiscal expansion will raise U.S.  utility. 
Thus a move from the Nash equilibrium  to the cooperative  equilibrium 
may involve a move of G and G* in opposite directions.  We will return 
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SOME  DYNAMIC  CONSIDERATIONS  IN  POLICY  COORDINATION 
So far, we have analyzed  the possibility  of welfare-improving  swaps 
of macroeconomic  policy in a static planning  environment.  Now we 
consider some of the implications  of moving to a more appropriate, 
multiperiod  setting. At one level little is changed; it is still easy to 
demonstrate  conditions  under  which  policy actions in the two countries 
are Pareto improving.  But at another level, much is changed. To the 
extent  that  the private  sector  acts in anticipation  of government  policies, 
the nature  of government  policy optimization  may be radically  altered. 
The formal  apparatus  for the intertemporal  optimization  problem  is 
fairly intricate, so only the general approach  is sketched here.15 We 
consider that each economy has an intertemporal  objective function  of 
the  form  VO  =  -=0  8&U(Q,,  r,, CA,).  In  the  dynamic  setting,  with 
forward-looking  agents, it is typical that in reduced  form Q, 'a, and CA 
are functions  of current  and  future  values of M, M*, G, and G*. For the 
moment let us avoid that complexity and write in the usual way that 
QO =  a MO +  a2GO +  a3MO* +  a4GO*  and  CAo  =  P1(MO-Mo*) + 
PAGO  -  G*). Also,  write  t, in the simple form  t, =  at -  +  TQ,. 
In this case, ar  is a state variable  of the system, and with ar  there is a 
co-state variable  X < 0 that measures  aV,/at,; that is, X  is the marginal 
loss in intertemporal  utility  caused  by inheriting  a higher  rate  of inflation. 
It is well known  that  the dynamic  optimization  problem  may  be rewritten 
as a static optimization  problem  by using  the co-state variable: 
(18)  max H  =  u(Qo, ro, CAo) +  Xl?l 
such that 
ITo =  T-F  +  TQO;  Qo =  a Mo +  a2MO* +  a3GO  +  a4GO* 
IT1 =  'N0 +  TQI;  CAo  =  PI(Mo-Mo)  +  2(GO-G*). 
Now the argument  proceeds  as before. 
15. See Miller  and Salmon, "Dynamic  Games," and Sachs, "International  Policy 
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At  the  noncooperative equilibrium, it  must be  that aH/aMo  = 
0 =  ula1  +  u2a1T  +  u3A3 +  X1Tal.  Also, aH/aM*  =  ula1  +  u2a3T  - 
u3A3 +  X1Ta3.  By combining  these two expressions we find aH/aM*  = 
-  u3A[(a  + a3)/a].  Once  again,  assuming  that a monetary  expansion 
worsens  the trade  balance  (131  < 0) and  that  a larger  trade  balance  surplus 
is preferred  to a smaller  trade  balance surplus  (u3 >  0), then aH/aMo*  > 
0, and a foreign  monetary  expansion  would tend to raise home welfare. 
With symmetric  countries, a common rise in Mo and Mo*  would raise 
both V and V*. In summary,  the fact that the optimization  problem  is 
now dynamic  does little, in this case, to change the method  of analysis 
or the specific  conclusions  regarding  monetary  policy. 
The problem  becomes considerably  more complicated  when current 
target  variables  are  functions,  via rational  expectations,  of future  policy 
variables.  Not only is the computational  complexity  increased, but the 
logic of optimizing V0 =  I,=O 8'U(Q,,  r,, CA,) is called into question,  as 
Kydland and Prescott first explained.16  In maximizing  V0,  the policy- 
maker  must choose at t = 0 an entire  path  of M and G, that is, MO,  MI, 
Go, GI, ....  The problem arises that at t =  1, when the policy 
authority  reconsiders  the problem  of maximizing  VI,  it will typically  be 
optimal to choose  a new path Ml, AM2,  A3, .  .  .,  G,  G2,1  .  .  , where M, #7 
M, and G, =, G,. Policymakers  will always want to deviate from their 
initial "optimal"  plans. They will announce  one thing  and then have an 
incentive to do another  after one planning  period. Time inconsistency 
arises whenever the private  sector takes action dependent  on anticipa- 
tions of future policies (for example, in formulating  asset demands). 
Time inconsistency is "solved" in one of two ways. The policymaker 
may  value his reputation  for consistency so much  that  he decides to stick 
with the original  plan, even though it is suboptimal  from the current 
vantage  point;  or the policymaker  may  announce  a suboptimal  but time- 
consistent set of policies, in which there is no incentive to alter the 
original  plans over time. We pursue this issue in Oudiz and Sachs but 
not further  here.  17 
16. See Finn  E. Kydland  and  Edward  C. Prescott,  "Rules  Rather  than  Discretion:  The 
Inconsistency  of Optimal  Plans,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 85 (June 1977),  pp. 
473-91. 
17. See Gilles Oudiz  and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Dynamic  Games  of Macroeconomic  Policy 
in a Multicountry  Model," to be presented  at the Centre  for Economic  Policy Research 
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ACHIEVING  A  COOPERATIVE  EQUILIBRIUM 
We have shown so far that there generally  exist policy options at a 
noncooperative  (N) equilibrium  in  which  all  countries  can  be made  better 
off. Getting from N  to a Pareto-improving  point is not, however, as 
simple  as it might  appear.  Precisely  because  the Pareto-improving  points 
are not Nash equilibriums,  it means that at least one country  will have 
an incentive to deviate from such a point if it assumes that the other 
country's policy is fixed. Figure  2 is instructive.  The Nash equilibrium 
is N,  Pareto  dominated  in welfare terms by C. However, if the foreign 
country  expands  its money supply  from  M*N to M*C, the best response 
for the home  country  is MF, given  by the tangency  of the home  country's 
indifference  curve  with  the horizontal  line  M*c; yet, if the  foreign  country 
chooses M*C while the home country "responds"  with MF, the foreign 
country is actually worse off than at N.18 Assuming a unique Nash 
equilibrium,  N is the only point at which both countries  are content to 
stay put, taking  as given what  the other  country  is doing. 
There are two related issues in the move from N to a point like C. 
First,  which  point  C should  be (or  will  be) chosen among  all  of the Pareto- 
improving  points?  Second, how can the equilibrium  C be enforced  given 
the incentives of each country to move unilaterally  from C? We have 
little  to add  to various  well-known  comments  on these questions. On  the 
set of desirable  points, most models of bargaining  restrict  the outcome 
to lie in the efficient set, from which further improvements in one 
country's welfare  are possible only at the expense of losses elsewhere. 
To enforce such an equilibrium,  there might  be (1) a policing  authority 
that imposes sanctions on violators, (2) a set of rules (such as a fixed 
exchange  rate  linking  M and  M*) that  are enforced  but within  which the 
various countries are free to act without external sanction, or (3) an 
equilibrium  upheld  by reputation,  in which the failure  to stick by one's 
word reduces the scope for making  agreements  with other countries  in 
the future. We will return  to questions  of institutional  arrangements  for 
cooperation  in the concluding  section. 
18. Actually,  F could have been to the right  of the foreign  indifference  curve  through 
N, in which  case both  countries  would  be better  off than  at N. However,  even in this case, 
the foreign  country  would  have an incentive  to move away from  M*c, assuming  that  the 
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Figure 2.  Enforcement Problems with the Cooperative Equilibrium 
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In our numerical  illustrations,  we choose the cooperative  point to be 
the  "Nash bargaining  solution" to the policy game played by the 
macroeconomic  authorities  in the various  countries.  (Note well that  the 
Nash bargaining  solution  is not the same  as the Nash equilibrium,  which 
is the point  N in  figure  1.)  In  a series  of influential  articles,  Nash described 
procedures  for picking  a point C in a bargaining  environment,  assuming 
that  the outcome  at Cis fully  enforceable.  In  a first  approach  he described 
a series of axioms to guide  the choice. In later  studies, Nash and others 
proposed various noncooperative  games whose rules lead to precisely 
the same point  as determined  by the axioms.  19 
In the Nash bargaining  solution there is a "threat point" that is 
assumed to occur if cooperation  breaks  down. It is natural  to take this 
point  to be the noncooperative  equilibrium  point  N in figures  1  and  2. At 
N, each country  i has utility  UiN.  The point C is then determined  as the 
feasible point that maximizes  the gain in utility  over the threat  point N, 
where the gain  is measured  by the following  product: 
19. For  a detailed  discussion  of the Nash  bargaining  solution  and  related  concepts, see 
Alvin  E.  Roth,  Axiomatic  Model  of  Bargaining,  Lecture  Notes  in  Economics  and 
Mathematical  Systems, no. 170  (Springer-Verlag,  1979). Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  37 
Gain =  (UlC -  UlN)(U2c -  U2N)(UC -  LP.v)  ...  (Unc  -  Un). 
The point  C will have to be efficient  (otherwise  it is obvious that  the gain 
could be raised  by moving  to a Pareto-superior  point). We will solve for 
C numerically  in the examples  that  follow. 
Simulating Coordination  of Economic Policies with a Large-Scale 
Econometric  Model 
The  gains  from  cooperation  seem obvious when  one refers  to a simple 
two-country symmetric  model. It is, however, much more difficult  to 
assess these gains  empirically.  Real-world  policymaking  involves neither 
symmetric  countries nor only two countries. On the contrary  it is the 
diversity  of the countries  involved  and  the wide range  of their  objectives 
that make cooperation a delicate issue and cooperation so hard to 
achieve. 
In this section we shall try to give an empirical  evaluation of the 
outcomes of cooperative or noncooperative  policymaking  among the 
United States, West Germany,  and  Japan.  To simplify  the problem  and 
make it tractable  we will retreat  from a full dynamic framework  and 
consider  instead  the static  model  in  which  the economies  are  represented 
by a set of multipliers  that  link the various "targets"  of each country  to 
the policy instruments  of all  of the countries.  These multipliers  are  taken 
first  from  the MCM  and  then  from  the EPA model. 
Our  strategy  is as follows. Let T  be the vector of targets, T = (Tl, T2, 
, Tn),  with Ti =  (Ti7  72,  .  .  .,  t)  We start with a baseline or "central 
variant"  projection  of T, denoted TB;  in fact TB  will be taken  essentially 
from a simulation  of the MCM for the period 1984-86. Let C be the 
vector of policy controls,  C =  (Cl, C2, .  .,  Cn). The matrix F contains 
the policy multipliers linking C to T, so that T =  CF +  TB  if we make the 
important  assumption of linearity. Thus when C  =  0, then T  =  TB 
according  to this normalization. 
Next we assume that the baseline is a Nash equilibrium  for the n 
countries.  That  is, we assume  that  if C', C2, ...,  Ci-1,  C+1, .  .  , Cn  are 
all zero at TB,  the optimal  policy for the ith country  is also Ci = 0. This 
assumption  allows us to identify  key parameters  of each country's  utility 
function  in the case of three targets  per country and two instruments. 
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are Mi and Gi.  At a Nash equilibrium,  aUi/aMi  =  0,  so that 0  = 
uI(aQq/dMi)  +  u2Grar/dMi)  +  u3(dCAq/dMi).  Similarly,  0 =  uI(aQq/dGi)  + 
u2(-ara/Gi) +  u3(aCAq/dGi).  The policy multipliers  (such as aQqaMi) are 
taken from the econometric models and are therefore "known." The 
utility  function can be normalized  by setting ul =  1 so that we are left 
with two equations  to find  two unknowns,  u2  and  U3.  Assuming  that the 
baseline  projection  is a Nash equilibrium,  we solve the equations  to get 
estimates of the marginal  utilities  of inflation  (u2)  and the trade  balance 
(U3).  Once these marginal  utilities are known we can calculate directly 
the marginal  returns  to policy coordination. 
The baseline estimates  come from  a simulation  of the MCM  made in 
late 1983  on the assumption  of no dramatic  change  in policy instruments 
in the 1984-86 period. The baseline yields a fairly flat path for output 
inflation  and the current  account. We converted  the MCM  trajectory  of 
real GNP into a 1984-86 trajectory  of GNP gaps based on our own 
estimates  of Okun's  law. Table  8 shows the results  of these calculations. 
We estimate the annual  long-run  trend  growth  to be 3.2 percent in the 
United States, 4.4 percent  in Japan,  and 3.2 percent  in West Germany. 
According  to the MCM  baseline, the U.S. GNP continues  to grow more 
rapidly  than trend  from 1984  to 1986,  with the GNP gap averaging  5.5 
percent over the period. Japanese growth is projected to be slightly 
below 4.4 percent, with the GNP gap averaging  6.0 percent over the 
three-year  horizon. German  growth is almost exactly 3.2 percent. As 
shown  in  the table, U. S. inflation  averages  4.4 percent  along  the baseline; 
Japanese  inflation,  2.6 percent;  and German  inflation,  3.0 percent. The 
external  balance as a percent of GNP is a deficit of 2.2 percent for the 
United States and a surplus  of 1.5 percent  for Japan  and 1.1 percent  for 
West Germany.  Overall,  this baseline  accords rather  closely with other 
forecasts that  assume unchanging  policies in the major  countries.20 
Next, we turn to the marginal  utilities of output, inflation,  and the 
current  account ratio (current-account/GNP).  The marginal  utility of a 
GNP increase (relative to baseline), sustained  for three years, is nor- 
20. For example, we may compare the baseline with OECD forecasts in OECD 
Economic  Outlook  (Paris:  OECD,  December  1983),  p. 14.  The  OECD  projects  annual  U.S. 
GNP growth  to be 5 percent  for 1984,  with growth  back to trend  at 3 percent  in the first 
half  of 1985.  Japanese  growth  is forecast  to be 4 percent  for 1984  and  3 percent  in the first 
half  of 1985  (and  thus  below  long-run  trend,  as in  our  baseline).  German  growth  is projected 
at 2.0 percent  for 1984,  rising  to 2.25 percent  in the first  half  of 1985.  The price  and  current 
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malized to equal 1.0. The other marginal  weights are calculated  using 
the two equations aU/aM =  0 and aU/aG =  0 at the baseline,  according 
to the procedure  described  in the appendix.  The welfare  costs, in GNP 
equivalents, of a 1 percentage  point increase in inflation  held for three 
years is measured  by u2.  A value of u2  =  - 2.0, for example, means  that 
on the margin, policymakers are indifferent  between a sustained 1 
percentage  point rise in inflation  and a sustained  GNP loss of 2 percent 
relative to baseline. Similarly,  U3 measures the marginal  utility of an 
increase in the current  account ratio of 1 percentage  point, sustained 
over three  years. A value  of U3  =  2 equates  a 1  percentage  point  increase 
in the current  account  ratio  with a 2 percent  rise in GNP for three  years. 
Since the EPA policy multipliers  differ  from  those of the MCM,  they 
suggest different values of  u2 and U3  along the baseline path. The 
calculated  values of u2  and  U3  for the two models  are shown  in table  9. In 
general,  we find  very high  marginal  weights  for inflation  and the current 
account  balance  (relative  to uI =  1  for GNP). It is not hard  to understand 
this finding.  In both the MCM  and  the EPA model it is possible to use a 
combination  of M (monetary  policy) and G (fiscal  policy) to arrive  at a 
GNP expansion with only a slight loss in inflation  (T) and the current 
account. However, if we accept the baseline as a Nash equilibrium, 
countries  are refusing  to take this option even though  the trade-offs  are 
so favorable. Implicitly  this suggests a very high weight on w and CA 
(the current  account ratio)  in the objective function. Another  interpre- 
tation is that the policymakers  in the various countries perceive the 
trade-offs  of Q (output)  with a and CA  to be much  less favorable  than  is 
suggested  by the models. Then, even if they care little about inflation, 
Table 8.  Characteristics of the Multicountry Model Baseline, 1984-86  Averagesa 
Percent 
Output 
Growth of  Current 
GNP  gap,  potential  GNP  gap,  account 
Country  1983b  GNP  1984-86c  Inflation  ratio 
United States  -  7.3  3.2  -  5.5  4.4  -  2.2 
Japan  -4.4  4.4  -  6.0  2.6  1.5 
West Germany  -10.4  3.2  -  10.7  3.0  1.1 
a.  Baseline  is assumed  to be a Nash  equilibrium. 
b.  Derived from Okun's law estimates. 
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for example, the perceived rise in inflation  for a given increase in GNP 
might  be so high  as to rule  out an expansionary  policy. 
Once we have these marginal  weights, we can examine  the scope for 
policy coordination. Consider, for example, the effect on utility of 
country  i of a rise  in  M in countryj,  a  UiVaM'.  We  know  that  this  expression 
equals (dQq/dMj)  +  u2(ad/qMj)  +  u3G3CAi/dMi),  which can now be 
calculated  directly. Table 10 reports  the values of a  Ui/aMi  and a  UilaGi 
for all countries i, j.  By construction,  the own-effects are zero at the 
Nash equilibrium;  all other effects are positive, except for the effect of 
a Japanese monetary  expansion on Germany  in the EPA model. Con- 
sider, for example, the effect of a U.S. fiscal expansion (1 percent of 
GNP) on Japan. In the EPA model, aUJIaGUs  =  0.78. In other words, a 
U.S. fiscal expansion is equivalent  for Japanese  utility to a sustained 
increase of Japanese  GNP of 0.78 percent  for three years. According  to 
the MCM  the gain is 0.43. Other  cross-country  effects are considerably 
smaller. And notably, neither Japanese nor German  policies have a 
significant  effect on U.S. utility. 
We have established  the marginal  welfare  effects on each country  of 
policy changes  in another.  But this incremental  analysis  does not tell us 
how far the countries  should  move in the Pareto-improving  direction  in 
order  to reach  an efficient  worldwide  policy mix. To find  the necessary 
overall  movement,  we must  define  global  rather  than  local properties  of 
the utility function. We choose to do this in a simple but admittedly 
restrictive  way by assuming that Ui(Qi, wi, CAi) is quadratic in Qi, wi, 
Table 9.  Partial Derivatives of National Utility Functions at Nash Equilibrium" 
Percent per year 
Economic  Planning  Agency 
model  Multicountry model 
Current  Current 
account  account 
Output,  Inflation,  ratio,  Output,  Inflation,  ratio, 
Country  ul  u2  U3  Ul  u2  U3 
United  States  1  -5.9  2.9  1  -4.5  0.0 
Japan  1  -  2.9  4.6  1  -  3.6  5.9 
West Germany  1  -  4.9  1.0  1  -  3.0  1.9 
a.  The marginal utility of a GNP increase (relative to baseline) sustained for three years, ul, is normalized to equal 
one;  U2 and  U3 give  the  inflation  and  current  account  deviations  that give  the  same  marginal utility.  The  Nash 
equilibrium is taken as the baseline  in the Multicountry  model shown  in table 8. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  41 
CAi,  with a bliss point  at a zero GNP gap, zero inflation,  and  a CA  target 
of CAi.  (For the United States, the external  balance  goal is taken to be 
zero; for Germany  and  Japan,  the goal is taken  to be 2 percent  of GNP.) 
Let (Qi)B,  (wi)B,  and (CAi)B be the values of Qi,  ri,  and CAi  along the 
baseline. The following  utility  function satisfies the bliss point and has 
the marginal  utilities  (1, u2, ui) that  we calculated  earlier: 
(19)  Ui  =  -1X2  [(1/QiB)(Qi)2  +  (U2/iiB)(Qri)2  +  (ui/CAiB)(CAl)2], 
~~~  ~~A  A 
where CAiB =  CAiB -  CAi, and CAi =  CAi -  CAi. It is easy to verify 
that Ui(0,  0, CAi) =  0 and that aUi/aQi =  1, Ua  Uil/wi  =  u2, and aUq/aCAi 
3  ui when the derivatives  are calculated  at the baseline. We rewrite  this 
function  as: 
(20)  Ui  =  -,/2  [  ,I(Q1)2  +  (1T(9i)2  +  i4(CAi)2], 
where 1Lj.  Xi, and 4j  are as shown in equation 19. The numerical  values 
of  Lj,  Xi,  and 4j are shown in table 11. 
By construction,  the baseline  path  is the noncooperative  (N) equilib- 
Table 10.  Cross-Country Gains from Fiscal and Monetary Expansion 
at Nash Equilibrium" 
Percent per year 
Economic  Planning  Agency 
Country  model  Multicountry model 
acting,  United  West  United  West 
and policy  States  Japan  Germany  States  Japan  Germany 
United States 
Fiscal  0.00  0.78  0.18  0.00  0.43  0.35 
Monetary  0.00  0.13  0.03  0.00  0.15  0.05 
Japan 
Fiscal  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.00  0.00 
Monetary  0.05  0.00  -  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.02 
West Germany 
Fiscal  0.01  0.53  0.00  0.07  0.17  0.00 
Monetary  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.05  0.12  0.00 
a.  Nash equilibrium is taken as the baseline shown in table 8. The welfare gains are expressed  in output-equivalents, 
that is,  one  unit of gain is equivalent  to a sustained  1 percent  increase  in affected  country's  GNP  for three years. 
The  unit of  fiscal  policy  is  a  sustained  increase  of  government  spending  equal  to  1 percent  of  GNP.  The  unit of 
monetary policy  is a sustained  decrease  of the discount  rate by 100 basis points. 42  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
rium.  We find  the cooperative  equilibrium  (C)  as the solution  to the Nash 
bargaining  problem: 
max  (UlC  -  U1N)(U2c  -  U2N)...  (UZCc  -  UnN). 
M|l'  l  '  >  ,...  Ml' 
G', G2, ...,Gn 
This maximization  is restricted  to the set of feasible policies for M and 
G. We impose no restrictions  on G but for M we require  that discount 
rates remain positive. In practice we allow a maximum cut of 5.8 
percentage  points  in the German  discount  rate  and  5.5 percentage  points 
in the Japanese  rate (the U.S. constraint  did not prove to be binding  in 
any of the simulations).  The solution is calculated numerically  by an 
optimal  gradient  search  routine. 
At this point it should be noted that the parameters  of the utility 
functions are dependent  both on the baseline and on the policy trade- 
offs the countries face. Let us make this point clear by using a simple 
example. Consider  a single  country  with  two objectives:  the output  gap, 
Q, and inflation, w; and one instrument:  fiscal policy, G. The policy 
multipliers  are 1 for the output and T for inflation.  Thus we have the 
following  equations: 
Q  =  G +  QB 
T  =  TG +  TB, 
with the  same notation as  above.  For the baseline to  be  a  Nash 
equilibrium,  the marginal  welfare  gain  for a change  in fiscal  policy must 
be zero: 
au=  au aQ +au  8X=U  T2=0 
aG  aQ aG+  a  =  ua  +  2=0. 
Table 11.  Utility Function Parametersa 
Economic  Planning 
Agency  model  Multicountry model 
Current  Current 
account  account 
Output,  Inflation,  ratio,  Output,  Inflation,  ratio, 
Country  [Li  +;  P;  [Li  +;  P; 
United States  0.07  0.49  0.47  0.07  0.37  0.00 
Japan  0.06  0.40  3.38  0.06  0.52  4.35 
West Germany  0.03  0.60  0.40  0.03  0.37  0.68 
a.  The parameters are normalized  so that the marginal utility,  at the baseline,  of an increase  in GNP  maintained 
for three years is equal to one.  See  equations  19 and 20 for definitions of parameters. Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  43 
(Note that all of the partial  derivatives  are evaluated at the baseline.) 
The partial  derivatives  are normalized  by assuming  that 
=  U 
aQ  -  =  1. 
Thus 
U2  =  -  1/T. 
Given  the assumptions,  u2  is nothing  other  than  a measure  of the output- 
inflation  trade-off. In other words, the partial  derivatives  of the utility 
function at the Nash equilibrium  are dependent only on the model 
multipliers. 
We now assume that U is quadratic  and compute the parameters  1L 
and  4: 
U  =~ -  Q2  +  (+w2). 
Since ul =  1 and u2 =  -  1/,  we have the following  equations: 
Ul =  -  QB  =  1 
U2  =  -4IB  =  -1/T, 
so that 
FL  =  uIQB  = 
- 
1/QB 
=  -U2/1TsB  =  I/TITB. 
Note that when  7B  iS  positive,  QB  must be negative; otherwise the 
baseline  cannot  be a Nash equilibrium.  For example, with a >  0 and  QB 
>  0, it is always possible to gain  on both targets  by a fiscal  contraction. 
Since the revealed preferences  of governments,  as measured  by kL', 
4i, and 4j, are reflected  in the paths  of output,  inflation,  and the current 
account, we can examine  the implicit  changes  in 1Lj,  Xi,  and  4j over time. 
For example, let us assume that for the 1976-78  period  the output  gap, 
inflation,  and current  account  reflect  a Nash equilibrium. 
Recomputing  the parameters  of the U.S. government  implicit  utility 
function using the multipliers  of the MCM for 1976-78, we find quite 
21. When  three periods  instead  of one are considered,  this is no longer  exactly true. 
The partial  derivatives  will be affected by a change  in the baseline, as is clear from the 
formulas  given  in the appendix  for ui, ui, u3. 44  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
different  parameter  values from  those in table 11. The values of 1Ll,  Xl, 
and 4i are now 0.10, 0.14, and 2.68, respectively. These new values 
show a much smaller  emphasis  on inflation  relative  to the output  gap as 
measured  by the ratio  /  which increases  from  0.2 to 0.7. Similarly, 
the implied  importance  of the current  account, as measured  by 4i/l, 
was also very much  higher  in the earlier  period. 
Each utility function will of course lead to different conclusions 
concerning  the desirability  of policy coordination  for the United States. 
In this sense, the advent of the Reagan administration  and the much 
smaller  weight  it placed  on the current  account  deficit  probably  reduced 
the attractiveness  of policy coordination  for the United States. 
COOPERATION  IN  THE  CURRENT  MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT 
We now proceed to three sets of simulations  in order  to address the 
following  questions:  (1)  What  improvement  of the  present  situation  could 
be achieved through  cooperation  among the United States, West Ger- 
many, and Japan  given unchanged  objective  functions?  (2) What  would 
be the implications for these three economies if the United States 
unilaterally  shifted its policy mix to fiscal contraction and monetary 
expansion?  (3)  How  beneficial  would  cooperation  be if  the  three  countries 
had  to face a third  oil shock about  half  as large  as that  of 1979? 
Suppose  that  we regard  the baseline  trajectory  as a Nash equilibrium. 
Can  all countries  materially  benefit  from  a coordinated  package?  Quali- 
tatively, the answer is almost surely yes, and since we have seen that 
a  UilaGJ  >  0 and  a Ui/Mi > 0 for almost  all i,  j, the nature  of coordination 
will  be ajoint reflation.  Quantitatively,  however,  it appears  that  the gains 
are  slight,  at  least when  policy  actions  are  restricted  to the  three  countries 
under study. Those who advocate a coordinated expansion as  the 
solution to global unemployment  must be presuming  (a) a much larger 
group  of countries  taking  policy actions in response  to coordination,  (b) 
a much  higher  degree of macroeconomic  interdependence  than  appears 
in the EPA model and the MCM, or (c) objective functions that differ 
significantly  from those of current  policymakers.  To put the last point 
another  way, it appears  to be the anti-inflation  bias (or anti-Keynesian 
views) of policymakers  rather  than  the absence  of effective coordination 
that  blocks a general  reflation. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  45 
Table  12. Policy  Optimization  in the Multicountry  Model, 1984-86 
United  States  West  Germany  Japan 
Policy and  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera- 
outcome  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion 
Welfare  gaina  .  .  .  0.17  . . .  0.33  . . .  0.99 
Fiscal  policyb  .  .  .  0.52  . . .  -0.21  . . .  -  1.15 
Monetary  policyc  . . .  2.14  . . .  5.80  . . .  5.50 
Deviations  from target valuesd 
Output 
1984  - 5.68  - 4.72  -  10.50  - 9.95  - 5.23  -5.41 
1985  - 4.97  - 3.80  -  10.70  - 9.65  - 6.00  - 4.45 
1986  - 5.67  - 4.86  -  10.91  -9.61  - 6.80  - 4.42 
Inflation 
1984  4.24  4.35  3.16  3.33  2.20  2.26 
1985  4.81  5.08  2.92  3.41  2.86  2.95 
1986  4.10  4.18  2.89  2.94  2.89  2.86 
Current 
account ratio 
1984  -2.25  -2.42  -0.95  -0.90  -0.31  -0.21 
1985  - 2.20  - 2.44  - 0.93  -0.81  - 0.56  -0.51 
1986  - 2.25  - 2.45  -0.99  - 0.80  - 0.64  - 0.70 
a.  The unit of welfare gain is equivalent  to a percentage  change  in GNP,  averaged over  the three years. 
b.  The unit of fiscal policy  is a sustained  increase  of government  spending equal to  I percent of GNP. 
c.  The unit of monetary policy  is a sustained decrease  of the discount  rate by  100 basis points. 
d.  Target values  are as follows:  output,  full employment;  inflation,  zero;  and current account  ratio, zero for the 
United States and 2 percent for West Germany and Japan. Deviations  are in percent for output and percentage points 
for annual inflation rates and the current account  ratio. 
The gains from coordination  are larger  in the MCM  (table 12)  than in 
the EPA model (table 13). Consider  table 12. The first  column  for each 
country shows the baseline for output (GNP gap), inflation, and the 
current  account ratio (relative  to target)  for the years 1984, 1985, and 
1986.  By construction,  the Nash equilibrium  is the same  as the baseline. 
The "cooperation" column shows the result of employing the Nash 
bargaining  solution  for each of the three  countries.  In the first  row of the 
table we measure  the welfare  gain relative  to baseline that comes from 
cooperation. The magnitude  0.17 for the United States signifies, for 
example,  that  coordination  is worth  an equivalent  of 0.17 percent  higher 
GNP over the three-year  period. The gain of 0.17 reflects a somewhat 
larger  actual gain in GNP (the GNP gap falls by 0.96 in 1984, 1.17 in 
1985,  and  0.81 in 1986),  minus  the welfare  costs of a small  rise in inflation 
and  a slight  worsening  of the trade  deficit.  In West Germany,  the welfare 
gain  is 0.33 percent  of GNP for three  years. Japan  is the big winner.  The 46  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 13.  Policy Optimization in the Economic Planning Agency Model,  1984-86a 
United States  West Germany  Japan 
Policy  and  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera- 
outcome  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion 
Welfare gain  ...  0.03  ...  0.03  ...  0.37 
Fiscal policy  . .  .  -  0.11  . ..  -0.16  . .  .  -  0.08 
Monetary policy  . . .  4.30  . . .  0.86  . . .  1.88 
Deviations  from  target values 
Output 
1984  -  5.68  -  5.15  -  10.50  -  10.79  -  5.23  -  4.97 
1985  - 4.97  - 4.06  -  10.70  -  10.84  - 6.00  - 5.07 
1986  -5.67  -5.11  -  10.91  -  10.44  -6.80  -5.11 
Inflation 
1984  4.24  4.32  3.16  3.10  2.20  2.30 
1985  4.81  4.83  2.92  2.80  2.86  3.15 
1986  4.10  4.19  2.89  2.94  2.89  3.21 
Current 
account  ratio 
1984  -  2.25  -  2.30  -  0.95  -  0.96  -  0.31  -  0.25 
1985  -2.20  -2.33  -0.93  -  1.14  -0.56  -0.51 
1986  -  2.25  -  2.32  -  0.99  -  1.27  -  0.64  -  0.69 
a.  See  notes  to table  12. 
move  to a cooperative  equilibrium  raises  Japanese  welfare  the equivalent 
of a 0.99 percent  rise in GNP over the three-year  period. 
The cooperative  equilibrium  is achieved  by more  expansionary  mon- 
etary  and  fiscal  policies in the United States, and  a mixed  policy of fiscal 
contraction  with monetary  expansion in West Germany  and Japan. It 
may seem paradoxical  that U.S budget  deficits actually  increase along 
the path to cooperation  but it must be remembered  that the objective 
function  weights  were selected  so that  U. S. policymakers  are  indifferent, 
on the margin,  between fiscal expansion  and fiscal contraction.  In any 
event, the fiscal actions are small relative to the interest rate actions. 
The  biggest  gain  in  coordination  comes  in  making  possible  a synchronized 
"worldwide" reduction  in central bank discount rates (which fall 2.1 
percent in the United States, 5.8 percent in West Germany, and 5.5 
percent  in Japan). 
In table 13,  the same  exercise is undertaken  with  the EPA model. The 
movement  from Nash to cooperative  equilibrium  involves contraction- 
ary fiscal policies and expansionary  monetary  policies in all countries. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  47 
Once again, Japan  is the big winner (0.37 percent increase in GNP in 
utility units), while for West Germany  and the United States welfare  is 
almost unchanged relative to the Nash equilibrium.  In this case, as 
before, coordination  mainly permits a drop in central bank discount 
rates of almost 1 percentage  point in Germany,  2 percentage  points in 
Japan,  and  4 percentage  points in the United States. 
Thus the policy effects of coordination  are neither  trivial nor huge, 
while the welfare effects of those policy changes seem rather small 
outside of Japan.  In a sense, as we have noted, much  of this could have 
been gleaned  directly  from table 6, where we saw that the German  and 
Japanese  policy links to the United States are almost nonexistent  in the 
EPA model. We stress one important  qualification  to this conclusion. 
The simulations  assume that no countries  other than  the three engaged 
in the bargaining  undertake  any policy actions in response  to the actions 
of the United States, Germany,  and  Japan.  However, even if France  and 
the United Kingdom  are not direct parties  to the bargaining,  they may 
find it desirable to respond with expansionary  policies of their own. 
Unfortunately, we simply did not have available the relevant policy 
multipliers for the other countries to allow us to incorporate such 
spillover effects; the MCM, for example, has no French block, so it 
would be impossible to assess directly the French policy response in 
that model. (Below, we extend our analysis by assuming  that Europe 
can be modeled  as a magnification  of West Germany.) 
EFFECTS  OF  A  SHIFT  IN  U.S.  POLICY 
Our  analytical  procedure  has been to assume that the baseline path 
represents  a Nash equilibrium.  For the United States this assumption 
means that when policyrnakers  balance the pros and cons of fiscal 
contraction  from a macroeconomic  point of view, the contractionary 
effects on output  just cancel the gains of lower inflation  and a smaller 
trade deficit. Of course, there are several other interpretations  of the 
present policy stance, the main alternative holding that the costs of 
today's U.S. fiscal  policy are well recognized,  and  are deemed  too high, 
but a deadlock over how to close the deficit has prevented  a change in 
policy. Would  a change  in U.S. policy that aimed  at reducing  the trade 
deficit  dramatically  affect the welfare  of Germany  and  Japan,  and  would 
it modify  our previous  appraisal  of the effects of coordination? 48  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 14  presents  the main  features  of an alternate  baseline  using  the 
MCM in which the utility weight on the U.S. current  account, 41,  is 
raised from 0.0 to 0.24. As a result, the United States modifies the 
macroeconomic policy mix by reducing government spending by 2 
percent of GNP and by lowering  the discount rate by 460 basis points, 
and  Germany  and  Japan  reoptimize  given their  previous  utility  functions 
(table 15). The new baseline is assumed, as before, to be a Nash 
equilibrium.22 
The  policy shifts  for  Germany  and  Japan  implied  by these assumptions 
are qualitatively  similar  to the U.S. policy shift. Both countries,  though 
to a smaller  extent, reduce government  spending.  The change is more 
noticeable for monetary  policy. Japan  lowers its discount rate by 180 
basis points while the German  discount rate is reduced  by 540 points, 
that  is, by a larger  amount  than  in the United States. 
One important  conclusion from this first step is that if the United 
States were to implement  the above policy shift, interest  rates  would  fall 
markedly  without any coordination  among the leading  economies; the 
scope for further  expansionary  monetary  policy thus would be greatly 
reduced. Surprisingly,  this new baseline is, on average, very similar  to 
the original  one (table 8) for Japan  and Germany.  The new U.S. policy 
leads ex ante  to a decrease  of output  of more  than 1  percent  for Germany 
and of 0.4 percent for Japan.  However, both countries  react by imple- 
menting expansionary monetary policies that prevent an excessive 
appreciation  of their currencies and a fall in output. For the United 
Table 14.  Alternate Baseline, Multicountry Model,  1984-86  Averagesa 
Characteristics  of baseline 
Policy  shifts  Current 
account 
Country  Fiscalb  Monetaryc  GNP gap  Inflation  ratio 
United States  -2.0  4.6  -5.9  4.2  -1.8 
Japan  - 0.4  1.8  - 6.0  2.6  1.5 
West Germany  -0.3  5.4  -10.9  3.0  1.0 
a.  The  utility weight  of  the current account  ratio is  raised to 0.24  from the  value  of zero  used  in table  11. As  a 
result,  U.S.  policy  is  shifted,  as  shown,  in order  to  produce  the  new  baseline  shown.  Germany  and Japan also 
reoptimize their policies  and performance. 
b.  The unit of fiscal policy  is a sustained  increase  of government  spending equal to  I percent of GNP. 
c.  The unit of monetary policy  is a sustained decrease  of the discount  rate by  100 basis points. 
22. Thus  the new baseline  is designed  to include  the German  and  Japanese  responses 
to the U.S. change  in revealed  preference. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  49 
States the policy shift induces a reduction  in GNP, lower inflation,  and 
a reduction  of the current  account  deficit  of close to 0.5 percent  of GNP. 
We now turn  to table 16, which compares  the Nash and cooperative 
equilibria.  Contrary  to the common  presumption,  the U.S. policy shift 
leaves West Germany  worse off, with a welfare  reduction  equivalent  to 
0.4 percentage  point of output on the new baseline. Japan, however, 
benefits  from the depreciation  of the dollar. In the cooperative  equilib- 
rium, output in the three countries  rises by an average of more than 1 
percent relative to the new baseline, but the welfare gain is markedly 
smaller than in our first simulation. Moreover, cooperation fails to 
restore German  welfare to its level under  the original  baseline, before 
the U.S. policy mix was changed. 
As already  noted, the scope for cooperation  is here greatly reduced 
by the simple fact that interest rates are now already  low at the Nash 
equilibrium.  The change in monetary  policies induced by cooperation 
among the three countries is correspondingly  far smaller. Comparing 
tables 12  and 16  shows that  Germany  lowers its discount  rate by a mere 
0.4 percent. More strikingly,  Japan  increases its interest rate by more 
than 1  percentage  point. 
The results of these simulations  call into question the conventional 
wisdom that U.S. policies are precluding  a European  recovery. That 
view makes  sense if the U.S. fiscal  expansion  has a contractionary  effect 
on Europe  via high  interest  rates that overwhelm  a direct  export effect. 
We showed above that a U.S.  fiscal expansion may be negatively 
transmitted  if the expansion causes a dollar appreciation  and a large 
corresponding  price  rise  in  Europe  via  wage  indexation.  The  econometric 
estimates of the MCM and the EPA model do not suggest that this 




Output,  Inflation,  ratio, 
Country  ,,?  4 
United  States  0.06  0.34  0.24 
Japan  0.06  0.52  4.35 
West Germany  0.03  0.36  0.67 
a.  See  equations  19 and 20  for definitions  of  parameters.  The  parameters  for  Germany  and Japan are  slightly 
different from those  in table  11 because  the normalizing condition,  aU'/aQ' =  1, is imposed  on a different baseline. 50  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 16.  Policy Optimization in the Multicountry Model, 1984-86:  Alternate Baseline, 
United States  West Germany  Japan 
Policy  and  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera- 
outcome  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion 
Welfare gainsbc  .  .  .  0.09  -0.43  -0.23  0.31  0.64 
Fiscal policyc  . . .  0.57  . . .  0.28  . . .  1.40 
Monetary policyc  . . .  1.46  . . .  0.40  . . .  -  1.28 
Deviations  from  target valuesc 
Output 
1984  -  8.07  -  6.82  -  10.72  -  10.19  -  5.75  -  4.20 
1985  -  5.21  -  4.02  -  11.00  -  9.87  -  5.81  -4.10 
1986  -  4.29  -  3.72  -  10.99  -  9.79  -  6.34  -  4.83 
Inflation 
1984  4.47  4.54  3.38  3.42  2.03  2.03 
1985  4.44  4.68  2.73  2.92  2.67  2.94 
1986  3.69  3.98  2.96  3.07  3.07  3.26 
Current 
account  ratio 
1984  -  1.70  -  1.79  -  1.13  -  1.18  -0.39  -0.42 
1985  -  1.71  -  1.87  -0.95  -  1.01  -0.58  -0.64 
1986  -2.15  -2.21  -0.94  -  1.04  -0.54  -0.65 
a.  The  alternate  baseline  is  evaluated  under the  assumption  of  a more restrictive  U.S.  fiscal policy  and a more 
expansionary  U.S.  monetary policy  than in the original baseline. 
b.  The welfare gain is measured from the original baseline  except  for the United States. 
c.  See  notes  to table  12. 
negative transmission  exists. The U.S. fiscal expansion  is measured  as 
raising  output and improving  the foreign external  balance in Germany 
and Japan,  enough to compensate, according  to revealed preferences, 
for any inflation  loss from  the strong  dollar. 
COOPERATION  FOLLOWING  AN  OIL  PRICE  SHOCK 
The deep recession of 1980-82  in the OECD economies came in the 
wake of the second oil price shock. All of the major  economies except 
Japan  adopted sharply  contractionary  monetary  policies in an effort to 
battle the inflationary  consequences of the price shock. One argument 
holds that the resulting  global deflation  was excessive from each coun- 
try's point of view because there was no coordinated  policy. In that 
view, each country  tightened  its monetary  policy in order  to strengthen 
its exchange rate and thereby  export some of the inflationary  shock to 
other  countries.  Given  the  tight  policies  pursued  elsewhere,  each  country Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  51 
had an incentive  to tighten  up even further  until, finally,  unemployment 
rates rose so much that inflation  fighting  on the margin  lost its appeal. 
Since one country's gain in exchange rate is another's  loss, it is clear 
that the attempt of each country to appreciate  vis-a-vis the others is 
globally  futile. If this argument  were correct, then cooperation  would 
make possible a general decline in interest rates and a smaller  loss of 
output. 
To examine  this question, we use the MCM  to ask how noncoopera- 
tive and  cooperative  policies would  be altered  if West Germany,  Japan, 
and  the United States were hit by a 50 percent  increase  in oil prices over 
the 1984-86 period.  This shock is about  one-half  the size of the 1979-80 
increase.  According  to the MCM,  such  a shock  has  a direct,  stagflationary 
impact;  with unchanged  policies it causes a decline in output, a rise in 
inflation, and a worsened external balance. The direct effects of the 
shock are evident in table 17  by comparing  the (before-shock)  baseline 
for each country  with the column  labeled  baseline  plus oil shock. 
According to the simulation,  an oil shock would induce monetary 
expansion in the United States and Germany,  accompanied  by a mod- 
erate U.S.  fiscal expansion. In Japan, monetary  policy turns sharply 
contractionary  and fiscal policy is slightly restrictive. The move to 
coordination  involves a sharp  interest  rate reduction  in the three coun- 
tries. According to the results of table 17, the swing in U.S. policy is 
from  a very limited  fall in interest  rates of less than 1  percentage  point  in 
the noncooperative  regime to a fall in rates of almost 2.5 percentage 
points under cooperation. The German swing is from a fall of  1.5 
percentage  points to a noticeable  fall of 5.8 percentage  points. In Japan, 
a sharp  monetary  contraction  under  Nash equilibrium  is abandoned  and 
interest  rates remain  stable. It must  be noted that we have added  the oil 
shock to the 1984-86 baseline, so the gains from cooperation  involve 
both the gains in reaction  to higher  oil prices and the gains that can be 
achieved  from  the initial  baseline  itself. To get some sense of the role of 
the oil shock alone in inducing  gains  from  cooperation,  we can compare 
the Nash and cooperative  equilibria  in tables 17 and 12. The oil shock 
does not appear  to induce any special gains from coordination  among 
the United States, Japan, and West Germany. On the contrary the 
increase in welfare when moving from the Nash to the cooperative 
equilibrium  is smaller  in the oil-shock case for the United States and 
Japan  and  essentially  the same  for Germany. "  r-  C)  kr  kr  (1  'IC^o 
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Extensions and Qualifications 
We offer our estimates of the gains from cooperation  as illustrative 
rather  than  definitive.  The issue of policy coordination  is too important 
to depend on a small set of estimates based on particular  objective 
functions  and specific macroeconometric  models. Unfortunately,  there 
is no way to test our results against  the findings  of others, since, as far 
as we know, ours is the first  attempt  to quantify  the gains  from cooper- 
ation in large-scale macroeconometric  models. We therefore think it 
worthwhile  to mention the sensitivity of our analysis to the following 
features:  the group  of countries  under  study;  the particular  models  under 
study and the use we made of them; the absence of uncertainty  in the 
treatment  of cooperation;  and the time horizon  for policy planning.  We 
conclude with a brief mention of some institutional  aspects of policy 
cooperation. 
THE  GROUP  OF  COUNTRIES 
Our empirical study focused on a bargaining  game among West 
Germany,  Japan,  and  the United States. This choice was partly  tactical 
and  partly  strategic.  Tactically,  the cross-country  multipliers  are  readily 
available for these,  the three largest market economies; exploring 
cooperation  for a wider  group  of countries  would  have required  that  new 
policy simulations  be undertaken  with the MCM  and the EPA model. 
(Conceptually,  and computationally,  there is no difficulty  in extending 
the analysis  to a much  larger  set of countries.)  Strategically,  our choice 
of countries  is probably  realistic.  In general,  the smaller  economies can 
probably  have a free ride on the policy decisions of the three largest 
economies. It would  be difficult  to engage  in successful negotiation  with 
a much larger  group of countries and still more difficult  to monitor  an 
agreement; at most, we might imagine the seven summit countries 
(Canada,  France, Italy, Japan,  the United Kingdom,  the United States, 
and West Germany)  as formal participants  in an enlarged  negotiating 
process. 
What  is unrealistic,  however,  is our  assumption  that  no  other  countries 
change their policies in response to the bargain  struck among the big 
three. We simply lacked the relevant  policy multipliers  to incorporate 
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agreement  on a policy package  with the United States and  Japan  might 
bring  about de facto agreement  with the rest of the EC on the essential 
elements. The policy constraints of the European Monetary System 
would  likely  push  other  countries  in  the EC  toward  matching  the German 
actions. In that case, the United States would have a much weightier 
bargaining  counterpart,  and the U.S.  gains from policy coordination 
might  be ipso facto substantially  enlarged. 
To test this view in a simple way, we have magnified  the German 
policy effects on the United States and Japan  by 3, and interpreted  the 
German  outcome as an "EC" outcome. The factor of proportionality 
was selected by examining  the effects on the United States of an EC 
fiscal  expansion,  and  a German  fiscal  expansion,  in a 1980  version  of the 
OECD  Interlink  model.23  The effects of the EC expansion  on output  and 
the current  account  were approximately  3 times the effects of Germany 
alone. 
The results of this extension using the MCM  are shown in table 18. 
Comparing  tables 12 and 18, we see that the U.S. and Japanese  gains 
from policy coordination  are increased  by a factor of 3 and the "Euro- 
pean" gain  by a factor  of about 1.7. Once  again,  the gain  is brought  about 
chiefly  by a worldwide  reduction  in  interest  rates  with  U. S. rates  dropping 
by more than 400 basis points. All countries  have much higher  output 
relative  to the Nash equilibrium;  Japan  gains  about 1.8 percent  in GNP, 
on average,  for the three  years, with virtually  unchanged  inflation  and a 
larger  current  account  surplus. 
Another  possible group  of countries  that might  be analyzed  is the EC 
itself. The trade  and  financial  links within  the EC are much  greater,  as a 
proportion  of GNP, than the links among the United States, Europe, 
and Japan. As we saw in table 1, for example, French exports to the 
United States represented  only 0.9 percent of French GNP, while its 
exports  to Germany  are  2.4 percent  of GNP. Thus,  our  findings  of modest 
gains from cooperation  among  the big three should  likely be multiplied 
severalfold  with  respect  to intra-European  cooperation.  We suspect that 
the greater scope for coordination  among the European  economies is 
the key reason that European  institutions  for macroeconomic  coordi- 
nation, such as the European  Monetary  System, have developed over 
23. See  Adrian Blundell-Wignall,  Flemming Larsen, and Franciscus Meyer-zu- 
Schlochtern,  "Fiscal Policy Simulations  with the OECD  International  Linkage  Model," 
in OECD Economic  Outlook: Occasional  Studies (Paris:  OECD,  July 1980),  pp. 3-32. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey  Sachs  55 
time, while coordination  among  the summit  seven remains  less institu- 
tionalized. In a future  paper, we plan to study the effects of European 
cooperation  using  the OECD  Interlink  model. 
USE  OF  THE  MCM  AND  THE  EPA  MODEL 
There exist at least two serious limitations  in our treatment  of the 
macroeconometric  models  and  two in the models  themselves. Regarding 
our treatment,  we assume that the models are nearly linear when we 
treat  policy outcomes  as equaling  the product  of a fixed  multiplier  matrix, 
F, and  the vector policy settings, C (remember  that  T = C  F +  TB, where 
TB is the baseline path for the target variables). In some cases this 
assumption  might  not  be bad;  a fiscal  expansion  will  probably  have about 
twice the output effect if the expansion is doubled. However, certain 
effects are inherently nonlinear. An exchange rate depreciation, for 
example, is more likely to improve the current  account balance if the 
economy is starting  in surplus  rather  than  deficit.  Thus, the sign of aCAI 
Table 18.  Policy Optimization with a Coordinated Europe: Multicountry Model 
United States  Europea  Japan 
Policy  and  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera-  Baseline  Coopera- 
outcome  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion  (Nash)  tion 
Welfare gainb  .  .  .  0.54  ...  0.56  ...  2.96 
Fiscal  policyb  .  ..  0.87  . .  .  -0.17  . ..  -  1.01 
Monetary policyb  .  .  .  4.06  . ..  4.60  . .  .  5.50 
Deviations  from  target valuesb 
Output 
1984  - 5.68  - 3.92  -  10.50  -9.91  - 5.23  - 5.17 
1985  - 4.97  - 3.31  -  10.70  - 9.46  - 6.00  - 3.61 
1986  - 5.67  - 4.16  -  10.91  - 9.41  - 6.80  - 3.58 
Inflation 
1984  4.24  4.45  3.16  3.24  2.20  2.17 
1985  4.81  5.28  2.92  3.41  2.86  3.02 
1986  4.11  3.90  2.89  2.98  2.89  2.83 
Current 
account  ratio 
1984  -2.25  -2.56  -0.95  -0.88  -0.31  -0.14 
1985  -  2.21  -  2.69  -  0.93  -  0.78  -  0.56  -  0.36 
1986  -  2.25  -  2.71  -  0.99  -  0.81  -  0.64  -  0.49 
a.  Europe's  impact  on  the  United  States  and Japan is  assumed  to  be  three  times  Germany's  impact  on  these 
countries. 
b.  See  table  12, notes  a-d. 56  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
AM  may depend on the policy setting of G. Similarly,  the question of 
whether  a devaluation  is expansionary  or contractionary  may depend, 
via a wealth effect, on a country's ex ante net indebtedness  in foreign 
currency  to the rest of the world. France has pursued  contractionary 
policies in 1983-84 partly because the appreciation  of the U.S. dollar 
has raised the franc value of French indebtedness to the rest of the 
world. In a linearized  model, however, the sign of aQ/la is assumed to 
be either positive or negative but unchanging  as a function of the 
country's  indebtedness. 
A second difficulty  in our treatment  is the implicit  assumption  that 
the "true"  model  of the  world  is known  with  certainty  and  that  exogenous 
shocks are absent during  the planning  period. It is well known since 
Brainard's  1967  work  that  model  uncertainty  can substantially  affect  the 
appropriate  choice of policy instruments  and in particular  cause less 
policy activism when multipliers are unknown.24  We have not yet 
investigated  the implications  of such uncertainty  for the logic of policy 
cooperation,  but it is important  to do so. We think Feldstein is correct 
when he says that such uncertainty  is a major  practical  impediment  to 
greater  policy coordination.25 
Other  limitations  reside  in the models  themselves. Many  of the crucial 
channels of interdependence  in recent years depend on the effects of 
policies on less-developed countries (LDCs). Tight U.S.  monetary 
policies, for example,  have raised  the real  indebtedness  of many  LDCs, 
and  this shift  in income  distribution  has contributed  to a dramatic  decline 
in LDC imports  from  Europe  in 1982-84. Given the rudimentary  nature 
of the rest-of-the-world  blocks in the EPA model and the MCM, this 
effect is surely not measured  with appropriate  magnitude  (if at all). It is 
probably  safe to assume that the impact  of U.S. monetary  policies on 
other OECD countries  is understated  in the EPA model and the MCM 
because of their inability to model the links of the United States to 
Europe  and  Japan  via the LDCs. 
Another  difficulty  with the models is that expectations  are treated  in 
a wholly  mechanical  way, making  policy simulations  subject  to the Lucas 
critique. For reasons suggested by Sims and by Sachs's comment on 
Sims's  paper,  we regard  the seriousness  of this  problem  to be an  empirical 
24. William  C. Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," American 
Economic Review, vol. 57 (May 1967,  Papers and Proceedings,  1966), pp. 411-25. 
25. See Feldstein,  "The  World  Economy  Today." Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  57 
matter and read the existing evidence as suggesting a very modest 
importance  of the Lucas critique  for short-run  policy simulations.  26 
THE  TIME  HORIZON 
Our  simulations  assume that monetary  and fiscal policymakers  seek 
to maximize  a utility  function  with  a three-year  horizon.  A longer  horizon 
would change  the optimal  macroeconomic  policies of each country  and 
would likely change the gains from coordination.  We have seen that a 
fiscal expansion  that causes a real appreciation  in the short  run  is likely 
to cause a depreciation  in the long  run.  Thus, the attractiveness  of a tight 
monetary  and loose fiscal policy mix for inflation  control is probably 
diminished  when one takes into account the long-term  implications  of 
the mix. If the U.S.  currency appreciation  is buying a larger future 
depreciation,  the ten-year  view would  likely  look less attractive  than  the 
three-year  view. 
What  is less clear is how the gains from coordination  would change 
with longer planning  horizons among the policy authorities. Qualita- 
tively, the gains from  coordination  will still be present, as illustrated  in 
an earlier  paper.27  The gains, however, may be reduced  quantitatively, 
since the realization  that short-run  appreciations  will be reversed  in the 
long run  may lead noncooperative  policymakers  to choose policies that 
are more  like the cooperative  settings. 
One frequent  argument  holds that policymakers  discount the future 
too highly, since their  sights  are set on the next election. It is interesting 
to speculate  whether  increased  cooperation  would  mitigate  or  exacerbate 
this bias. Certainly  some forms of policy coordination  are helpful, as 
when weak-currency  countries  peg to strong  currencies  (or even adopt 
those currencies) in order to  restrain the tendency toward overly 
expansionary policies that short planning horizons often engender. 
Rogoff, on the other hand, has developed an ingenious  model in which 
policy coordination worsens the short-horizon  bias.28  In his model, 
wages are set in advance  of macroeconomic  policies in each period  but 
26. See Christopher  A. Sims, "Policy Analysis with Econometric  Models," BPEA, 
1:1982,  pp. 107-52, and  the comment  that  follows. 
27. See Sachs, "International  Policy  Coordination." 
28. See Kenneth  Rogoff, "Productive  and  Counterproductive  Cooperative  Monetary 
Policies," International  Finance  Discussion  Paper  233  (Board  of Governors  of the Federal 
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in anticipation  of the macro  policies that  will be set. Once wages are set, 
governments  have an incentive to expand the economy at a modest 
marginal  cost  of higher prices. Since wage setters understand this 
tendency, they are induced  to set high  nominal  wages in anticipation  of 
it, and  the economy is beset with an inflationary  bias. One  constraint  on 
inflation  that remains, however, is each country's fear of a unilateral 
expansion. Rogoff points out that policy coordination  can remove this 
constraint  and  worsen  the inflation  bias by convincing  each government 
that the other  governments  are going  to join in its expansion. The result 
is that  all countries  intensify  their  bias toward  excess inflation. 
THE  INSTITUTIONAL  CONTEXT  OF  POLICY  COORDINATION 
Our  analysis concerns the gains from cooperation  without  regard  to 
the institutional  context in which policy cooperation  might occur. No 
doubt the costs of negotiation  must be weighed in a full assessment of 
the potential  benefits  from coordination.  The Nash bargaining  solution 
assumes, for example, that a policing mechanism  exists to enforce a 
bargaining  equilibrium.  Does such a mechanism exist? Is reputation 
enough to sustain a bargaining  outcome? What role, if any, should 
international  organizations  like the IMF, the EC, and  the OECD  play in 
fostering and overseeing cooperative arrangements?  Are the summits 
the natural  locus for such activity? These issues are a matter  of active 
study among political scientists and economists. Our hope is that our 
more  formal  results  can provide  an input  into this area  of research. 
One  line of analysis  is particularly  important  on the institutional  front 
and  that  is whether  cooperative  outcomes  can  be replicated  by essentially 
noncooperative actions under a new set of rules of the game. For 
example, we have seen that one reason for cooperation  is that under 
flexible  exchange  rates  there  is a tendency  to choose monetary  and  fiscal 
policy with the goal of moving  the exchange rate in one's favor. When 
countries  are  fighting  inflation,  each  will  try  to contract  the money  supply 
for the disinflationary  benefits of a currency appreciation.  With sym- 
metric countries, no country achieves an appreciation,  but all suffer a 
real  output  contraction. 
We  can  think  of at  least two mechanisms  for  overcoming  this  problem. 
First, in summit  style, the countries  might  agree  to avoid  a "competitive 
appreciation," with the heads of  state explicitly endorsing such a 
common policy. Possibly, a joint reduction in interest rates could be Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  59 
engineered. Alternatively, new rules for target exchange rate zones 
might  be instituted  (as in the European  Monetary  System), within  which 
countries pursue independent  policies. A constrained  noncooperative 
equilibrium  might then come very close to the optimal cooperative 
equilibrium.  This alternative  approach  brings economists deeply into 
the institutional  setting  of macroeconomic  policy, precisely where they 




HERE  are  the detailed  derivations  to which  the paper  refers.  The notation 
is the same. We consider an n-country  world. Country  i has m policy 
targets. Its vector of targets is Ti = (Ti,.  .  Tm).  It has 1  controls, which 
are the elements of vector Ci =  (Ci, .  .  .,  C5).  The authorities maximize 
a welfare  function Ui(T'). 
The targets  are assumed  to be linear  functions  of the controls: 
T =  CF +  TB, 
where T =  (T', T,  .  .  .,  Th)  is the overall vector of targets,  TB  =  (TB1, 
TB2,  .  .  .,  TBn)  is the value of T at the baseline,  C =  (C', .  .  .,  Cn) is the 
overall  vector of controls,  and F is the matrix  of multipliers. 
In our  empirical  examples  the Ti  have nine  elements:  the values of the 
output  gap, inflation,  and the current-account/GNP  ratio  as a deviation 
from target  over the years 1984  to 1986;  the Ci have two elements: the 
measures  of fiscal  and monetary  policies. More  precisely: 
T = (Q84,  Qi,  6  ITi84,  85,  IT86, CAi4, CA85 CAi ) 
ci  =  (Mi, G). 
Derivation of the Utility Function 
In the paper we describe a two-step procedure. First the marginal 
utilities of the targets are derived and then we assume that the utility 60  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
function  is quadratic.  Given three  targets  (output,  inflation,  and current 
account)  and two instruments  (monetary  and  fiscal policy) the marginal 
utilities are exactly identified  by imposing  aU/aM =  0 and aU/aG =  0 
with the normalizing constraint that u1 =  1. 
As soon as the number  of targets  is larger  than  the number  of controls 
by more than one, that is, m -  1  >  1, this procedure  must be modified. 
This is the case for our empirical  computation  since each country has 
nine targets  (output,  inflation,  and current  account  for three  years). We 
have thus proceeded in the reverse order. First we  have specified 
quadratic  utility  functions: 
Ui=  1T2TiRiTT, 
where TiT  denotes the transpose  of Ti  and  Ri is a matrix  of parameters  of 
the utility  function. 
We assume that  the baseline  is a Nash equilibrium.  Thus 
aUi/aCi  =  -TiRiFri  =  (0,  0, .  .  ., O), 
where Fii is the block of matrix F which contains the multipliers  of 
country  i's targets  with respect  to country  i's controls.  If we assume  that 
Ri is a diagonal  matrix,  we have m unknowns  for 1  equations and one 
normalizing  restriction  such as 
aUi/aTi =  1. 
Here we further specify Ri by assuming  that the utility functions are 
discounted  sums of an annual  utility  function: 
1986 
ui=  -  1/2  (1  +  8)(1984-t) [iR(Qi)2  +  4i(.(ri)2 +  4,(CAi)2]. 
t=  1984 
The corresponding  Ri matrix  is therefore 
(1 +  Ri  6Y' 
(1 +  6-2Aii  0 
'fi 
Ri=  (1 +  6)'-4,l 
(1 +  6)-24i 
O  ~~~~~~(1  +  6)'Pi~ 
(1 +  6)-2+~ Gilles Oudiz  and Jeffrey Sachs  61 
For all countries,  8 is assumed  to be equal  to 0.1. The three parameters 
Ri,  Pi, and Pi  are solutions  of the following  system of three  equations. 
a Ui/Mi=  0 
alqaGi  =  0 
aui/8Qi=  1, 
1986 
where  aUi/aQi =  E  (aUq/Qi). 
t=  1984 
In table  9 we gave the partial  derivatives  of the national  utility  functions 
at the baseline with respect to a sustained  increase over three years of 
each target.  With  our specific  utility  function, 
1986 
ali/aQi=  Ui=  -  E  (1 +  8)('984-t)RiQi 
t=  1984 
1986 
auil/aii  =  u2  =  -  E  (1  +  8)(1984-t)kf,Ti 
t=  1984 
1986 
ai/aCAi=  ui=  -  E  (1  +  8)(1984-tiJ,CAi 
t=  1984 
Note that ui is normalized  to 1.0  for all i. 
The cross-country  gains from fiscal and monetary  expansion at the 
baseline  presented  in table 10  are given by: 
a Ui/aC=  -TBiRirF. 
Because the baseline  is a Nash equilibrium,  by definition  a Ui/aCi  = 0. 
Derivation of the Nash and Cooperative  Equilibriums 
The Nash solution corresponds to the case where each country 
maximizes  its welfare,  taking  as given  the other  countries'  policies. Thus 
the problem  of country  i is: 
max  Ui -  -  2TiR.TiT 
C' 
subject  to Ti =  E  CiFij  +  TBi 
Cl e (,  where (i is the set of feasible policies. 62  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
For our empirical  simulations  we have imposed no bound on fiscal 
policy, but we have constrained  the discount rate to remain  positive.29 
For all our empirical  simulations  the constraints  on the controls  proved 
to be nonbinding  at the Nash equilibrium.  The solution  is thus straight- 
forward.  The first-order  conditions  for country  i are 
aUq/aCi=  -TRilTO  =  . 
The values of the controls, CN, which lead to the Nash equilibrium 
and  of the corresponding  target  values TN  are given by 
CN  =  -  TBF(FF)  I 
TN  =  CNF  +  TB 
where 
R21r2T20 
The welfare  gain  for each country  is 
U-  -  1/2 
TlR,TT 
+  ?  TiRiTiT. 
A cooperative equilibrium  corresponds to the case where all the 
countries  act  jointly so as to maximize  a collective utility  function. This 
collective utility function is assumed to be a weighted average of each 
country's  own utility  function. Only  a subset of the cooperative  equilib- 
riums  are Pareto  improving.  Among  these, we define  the optimal  coop- 
erative equilibrium  as the one that maximizes  the collective gain of the 
countries,  as defined  below. 
A  cooperative equilibrium  is  thus the  solution of  the following 
problem: 
max UC(wl,  w2,..  .,  wn) =  -?TRc(w'  W2,.  .  .  wn)TT 
c 
subject to T =  cF  +  TB 
rC E  .  ?;  _  =  ?  (  ?)  9  29.  . 
29. The maximum  cut in the discount rate is 7.5 percentage  points for the United 
States, 5.8 percentage  points  for West  Germany,  and  5.5 percentage  points  for Japan. Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs  63 
where 
WIR, 
w2R2  0 
Rc(wl,W2,  .  .  .  ,  Wn) 
0  wnR 
and wl, w2,  .  ..  ,  wn denote the weights granted  to each country in the 
cooperative  process. When  the constraints  are not binding,  the solution 
is simply 
CC=  -TBRcFT(FRcFT)  1 
TC  =  CcF  +  TB 
and the welfare  gain  is 
UC  UN  =  12TCRcTCT  +  ?/2  TNRCTNT. 
The optimal cooperative equilibrium  referred  to in the paper is the 
solution  to the Nash bargaining  problem: 
max Gain =  (Ulc  -  U1N)  (U2C  -  U2N)  ...  (UtiC-  UtiN) 
WI,  w2,  .  .  .  ,W? 
The set of weights that yield this optimal  cooperative  solution is calcu- 
lated numerically  by an optimal  gradient  method. 
In tables 12 to  17 we refer to the welfare gain from cooperation 
"measured  in  units  of GNP.  " This  is a measure  of compensating  variation 
relative to the baseline. Consider  the baseline  {Q1984,  Q985, Q986,  IT1984, 
1T1985, IT1986, CA984,  CA1985,  CA1?986};  this has utility UB. Now, raise Q  by 
an amount A in every year 1984-86; the new target vector becomes 
{Q1984  +  A,  Q1985  +  ,  Q1986  +  A  r19845  1985,  1986,  CA1Ij984,  1A985, 
CAjB86},  which has a new utility level we denote  UB  (1). 
Suppose that cooperation  yields a utility  level Uc >  UB. The "GNP- 
equivalent  welfare  gain"  from  cooperation  is the level of A such that Uc 
=  UB (A). It can be easily shown that A is the root with the smallest 
absolute  value of 
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where p.  is the parameter  of the quadratic  utility  function  corresponding 
to Q and 
=  1  +  (1?+8)-'  +  (18)-2 
X=  QiB84  +  (1+  )'QjB  +  (1  +  8)  2Q986 
More  precisely, 
i\  =  -  -  {1_A  +  (2A)(Uc  - UB)]}. 
It should be noted that A is approximately  equal to Uc  -  UB if the 
change  in utility  is small. Comments 
and Discussion 
Olivier  J. Blanchard: This is a very stimulating  paper.  What  makes  it a 
particularly nice paper to  discuss is  that it has an important and 
controversial punch line: economic cooperation among the United 
States, West Germany,  and  Japan  will, at best, achieve modest welfare 
gains. The scope for U.S. welfare  gains  in particular  is very limited.  The 
job of a discussant is therefore  obvious. Rather  than to nitpick, it is to 
see whether  a strong  case can be made  for cooperation.  To do so, it is 
convenient  to follow the organization  of the paper  and  to ask two sets of 
questions. The first concerns country interactions. Are all relevant 
interactions  adequately  and  fully captured?  The second concerns  objec- 
tive functions. Could it be that the way the authors specify countries' 
objective  functions  biases the case in some way against  coordination? 
A bare-bones version of the theoretical  model of the paper can be 
written  as a system of four equations  for each of two countries: 
q =  a(q, r) +  nx(q, q*, X) 
m -  p  =f(q,r) 
r -  r* =  g[(bl(b +  Xb*)] 
p  = p(X, g) 
The notation  is as in the paper:  a is absorption,  nx net exports, b debt, 
and asterisks denote foreign variables.  The model is Mundell-Fleming 
with two twists. The first is the replacement  of the interest-rate  parity 
relation  by a portfolio-balance  equation.  This is motivated  by the poor 
performance  of strict  parity  equations  and  by strong  theoretical  support 
in favor of such a portfolio relation; there is, however, little or no 
empirical  evidence  in  favor  of the  portfolio-balance  equation.  The  second 
is the presence of a price equation  allowing  for a direct  effect of the real 
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exchange  rate  on prices. This is important  for policy, and ultimately  for 
coordination,  because it implies  that  fiscal  and  monetary  policies, if they 
have different  effects on the exchange rate, will have different  impacts 
on inflation  given output.  In this way, the policy mix  can affect  the trade- 
off between output  and inflation. 
The model therefore  captures  all interactions  through  labor, goods, 
and assets markets  which we know or think should exist. However, it 
leaves out one type of interaction  that is currently  important:  the direct 
interaction  among  policies. If, for example,  we were to attribute  most of 
the increase in European  real rates of interest to U.S.  monetary and 
fiscal policies, these policies would account for up to one third of the 
inflation-adjusted  average  budget  deficit  in the European  Community  by 
raising  real interest  payments  on debt. 
Turning  to the two empirical  models used in the paper, one initially 
suspects that  these models are unlikely  to capture  all the interactions  of 
the theoretical model. Looking at their structure, however (or more 
precisely, at the structure  of the EPA model, as I have no familiarity 
with the other),  one is surprised  by its similarity  to that  of the theoretical 
model. It includes, in particular,  the two twists mentioned  above: price 
equations  with a potential  role for the exchange  rate and, more surpris- 
ingly in view of the weak empirical  evidence, portfolio-balance  equa- 
tions. 
The empirical  models have rich dynamics. These are not, however, 
rational-expectation  dynamics,  and  hence they exclude some of the most 
drastic  forms of overshooting  and may underestimate  the size of move- 
ments in the exchange rate. This is probably not a major problem. 
Overshooting, by its nature, is an exchange-rate movement which 
eventually reverses itself. A model that does not capture it will, for 
example, underestimate  the short-term  effect of a monetary  contraction 
on inflation  but overestimate  its effect in the medium  term. If a govern- 
ment is concerned about both the short and medium terms, ignoring 
overshooting  may not be very misleading. 
It is therefore reasonable  to conclude that, while the multipliers  in 
tables 5 and 6 are imprecise,  they are not systematically  biased against 
coordination.  I shall  not discuss them, except to note for use below that 
although  U.S. fiscal and monetary  policies have opposite effects on the 
exchange rate, they have roughly the same effects on inflation. The 
United  States appears  sufficiently  closed that  the exchange  rate  has little 
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Last, I turn  to the specification  of objective functions. The strategy 
of Oudiz  and Sachs is to assume that countries  are doing their uncoor- 
dinated best and to  use  revealed preferences to  recover objective 
functions. This strategy  is clearly the right  one: if countries  are not, in 
some sense, doing the best they can, how can we talk of coordination? 
Thus, I agree  with the logic of the approach.  But I have some problems 
with its implementation. 
Consider  first  why we usually  believe that  a strong  case can be made 
for coordination.  We think,  for example, of a group  of countries  experi- 
encing a recession, with each country being reluctant to use fiscal 
expansion  for fear of the effects on the current  account. Table 5 shows 
these effects to be quite  large.  In this case, coordinated  fiscal  expansion 
achieves reflation  without  current  account deficits. The return  to coor- 
dination  is large. 
Oudiz  and Sachs correctly  point  out that  this view of each country  as 
having  only one instrument  and  two targets  is too simple.  Countries  have 
at least two instruments,  fiscal and monetary  policies. In the case just 
mentioned,  they can use a mix of tight  fiscal  and  loose monetary  policies 
and  alleviate  the current  account  problem.  But  they also have more  than 
two targets.  Oudiz  and  Sachs  assume  the existence of only three:  output, 
the current  account, and  inflation. 
This limited list of targets  is particularly  objectionable.  It implicitly 
assumes  that  current  stances  of fiscal  and  monetary  policies are  optimal, 
so that the current  U.S. budget  deficit  is the result of an unconstrained 
macroeconomic  policy decision. I believe it is evident that little sense 
can be made of the current  U.S. policy without introducing  at least a 
"cost" of decreasing the budget deficit. It is not clear what current 
estimates really mean. Their treatment  implies that current  U.S. trade 
deficits  reflect,  in large  part,  indifference  of the U.S. government  to such 
deficits:  the marginal  disutility  of current  levels of the current  account 
deficit  is, using MCM estimates in table 9, equal to zero. The authors 
attempt  to deal with this issue when they assign an arbitrarily  higher 
weight  to the current  account in table 14, but one cannot  judge whether 
this adjustment  goes far enough. It is interesting  that they still find  that 
the gains  from  trade  are small, and  it makes  one wonder  how much  their 
specification  of targets would have to change in order  to overturn  that 
conclusion. 
A more  appealing  specification  would likely yield a stronger  case for 
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United States has three targets  and two instruments.  However, two of 
the targets are directly  linked:  we have seen above that U.S. inflation 
depends mostly on output and very little on the exchange rate. This 
implies that, to a first approximation,  the United States has two inde- 
pendent targets and two instruments.  In this case, as noted by Oudiz 
and Sachs in their theoretical  discussion, whatever the United States 
can achieve, it can achieve on its own and will not benefit from 
cooperation. Their results might thus be quite different  if there were 
costs to changing  fiscal policy or, equivalently, if a new target were 
introduced.  And  the case for coordination  would  probably  be somewhat 
strengthened.  However, it remains  true that the multipliers  are small 
enough that their qualitative  conclusion of only small benefits from 
coordination  for the United States would  probably  remain. 
Stephen  N. Marris: This is an important  paper.  First, in line with other 
recent work, it reestablishes the analytical  case for the international 
coordination of macroeconomic policies under a system of flexible 
exchange  rates. Second, and  this is its most  fascinating  originality,  it not 
only recognizes that the gains from such cooperation  will depend on 
countries'  preference  functions,  which  may  well differ,  but  goes on from 
there to try bravely  to estimate  these from  observed  behavior.  This is a 
significant  technical  advance,  even though  a close look suggests  that  the 
results so far achieved  are of dubious  value. 
For the first twenty-five years after the war, with an adjustable  peg 
exchange rate system,  the case  for macropolicy coordination was 
generally  takenforgranted.  With  quasi-fixed  rates,  thefree-riderproblem 
was very evident. Whether  insufficient  demand  or too much inflation 
was the problem,  each country  had  an interest  in seeing  that  others  took 
the necessary expansionary (or restrictive) actions. Both rules and 
"reputation"  were used to try to overcome this  free-rider  problem,  with 
considerable  success. The Bonn  summit  was not the  first  explicit  attempt 
at macropolicy  coordination;  it was the last. 
In the 1970s, policymakers  were strongly influenced  by a class of 
models in which freely floating exchange rates automatically  yield a 
world Pareto optimum, so that attempts  to "coordinate" would be at 
best redundant.  This paper  (a) sets out rather  rigorously  the theoretical 
conditions under which, with floating rates, "coordination" would 
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parameters  in the best existing empirical models are such that "an 
uncoordinated  selection of macroeconomic  strategies  is likely to lead to 
an inefficient  mix of monetary  and fiscal policies, and to an inefficient 
overall stance on the level of output selected." Having thus firmly 
established  the case for expecting  gains from  coordination,  the authors 
may have been a bit disappointed  that their attempt  at quantification 
leads them to conclude that the gains from coordination  "appear  to be 
modest." For the reasons  given below, however, this is an overly hasty 
conclusion. 
Over the past three years the United States has been following a 
strongly  expansionary  fiscal  policy, Japan  and  West  Germany  have been 
following  equally  restrictive  fiscal  policies, and  all three  have  been trying 
to follow  "nonaccommodating"  monetary policies. In the baseline 
projection  for 1984-86-critical because of the assumption  that it is a 
Nash equilibrium-the authors  assume "no dramatic  change  in policy.  " 
(One difficulty in interpreting  the results is that we are not told the 
specific settings of fiscal and monetary policy nor what happens to 
interest rates and exchange rates in the baseline, nor what happens  to 
exchange  rates in all the subsequent  simulations.) 
What  happens  if the three countries "cooperate" (MCM,  table 12)? 
America  is happy  to do some monetary  expansion  as long as the others 
are prepared  to do even more. This opens up scope for America  to take 
more expansionary  fiscal action since (a) this has virtually  no inflation 
cost because it appreciates  the dollar, and (b) America is completely 
indifferent  to a deterioration  in its current  balance (table 9). Germany 
and Japan, however, apparently  hate the loss of net exports resulting 
from their monetary  expansion, which they therefore  reduce by more 
fiscal restraint. 
These results are-to  put it mildly-counterintuitive. Nevertheless, 
at first sight they have a certain  fascinating  logic. Since these countries 
are assumed to be happy  with their  present  policies, then perhaps  they 
would be even happier  if, cooperatively, they did more of the same- 
though  since they are already  doing it. uncooperatively,  the additional 
benefits  are small. A second look, however, suggests  that  in certain  key 
respects the assumptions  on which the whole analysis rests-that  the 
models  are "true" and  the countries  agree  with this truth-do  not hold. 
Table  9 "reveals" that  Japan  is prepared  to give up 5 percent  of GNP 
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average  shadow  price  for  foreign  exchange  is 3.3 for  Japan  and  Germany 
together.  This is intriguing;  we all suspect that  others  are mercantilist- 
but  to that  degree?  After  all, for any  rational  country  in  full  (neoclassical) 
equilibrium,  the shadow  price should  be one, and even with disequilib- 
rium  the weighted  average  for the system as a whole should still be one 
(as long as the supply of international  liquidity is adequate). These 
implausibly  high shadow  prices emerge  with impeccable  logic from the 
following considerations:  if countries are happy to pursue restrictive 
fiscal policies when (a) they have large  and rising  potential  output  gaps 
and  (b) fiscal  expansion  is the least inflationary  way of reducing  these, it 
can be only because (c) fiscal  expansion  has the most adverse  impact  on 
net exports, to which, ergo, (d) they must  attach  very high  disutility. 
If told that this was their motivation,  German  and Japanese  policy- 
makers  would  immediately  respond  that  they have a quite  different  view 
of the "truth" about how fiscal policy works. Most explicitly for the 
Germans,  they believe that fiscal restraint,  while depressing  output in 
the short run, will-because  of improved confidence and "crowding 
in"  -lead  to higher  output  two or three years hence. If one substituted 
models with these properties,  one would radically  change not only the 
magnitude  but also the sign of most of the results  given in this paper.  In 
particular,  Germany  and Japan  would not react to U.S. fiscal restraint 
by doing the same (table 14); with less expansionary  stimulus  coming 
from America,  they would logically impose less  fiscal restraint  because 
its short-term  costs would rise relative to its perceived longer-term 
benefits. 
Second, in one important  respect the U.S. administration  appears  to 
be assuming  the models are "true" when they are  probably  false. In the 
baseline America  piles up about $500 billion of public-sector  debt and 
$250 billion of external debt without, apparently,  any rise in interest 
rates  or decline in the dollar  sufficient  to matter.  In an important  section 
dealing  explicitly with the longer-run  consequences of debt accumula- 
tion, the authors  point out that these longer-run  effects may well go in 
the opposite direction.  Many  observers  may well suspect that  this could 
happen within the three years covered here, in which case the U.S. 
shadow price for foreign exchange would look very different. If so, 
America should take significant  restrictive  fiscal action (tables 14, 15, 
and 16), and for the reasons discussed above this should prompt 
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dismissal  of "conventional  wisdom" on this subject  is quite  unfounded. 
Third,  as the authors  note, current  policymakers  in all three  countries 
appear  to have very different  views of the "truth"  about  inflation.  In the 
models, 1 percent of GNP costs, on average, 0.2 percent in inflation. 
Since policymakers  do not exploit this in the baseline, they are "re- 
vealed" to give inflation  a shadow price of more than 4. This does not 
matter  much  in the scenarios  discussed  here, with  their  comfortably  high 
growth rates. But if we get ourselves into a new recession, it clearly 
would  matter  a lot who is right. 
Enough  has been said to suggest  that the authors  have explored  only 
the outer fringes of the fascinating  and important  new territory  opened 
up by their  pioneering  efforts. A great  deal remains  to be done. In some 
ways the two models stand up quite well to the extremely heavy load 
put on them  in this paper.  But they will remain  inappropriate  for the use 
to which they are put here unless longer-term  effects from  accumulating 
debt and rising inflation  are realistically spliced into their essentially 
short-term  mechanisms.  More  work  is also needed  to explore  the crucial 
relationship  between policymakers'  revealed preference  (and how this 
varies over time)  and  their  (differing)  views about  how the world  works. 
And from there, an effort should be made to move from revealed 
preference to a set of shadow prices that, while allowing for genuine 
national  differences,  provides a sensible and internationally  consistent 
basis for macropolicy  coordination. 
Until this has been done it would  be best if policymakers  did not read 
this paper. It is true that in some ways it sheds fascinating  light  on how 
policymakers,  starting  from quite different  views about how the world 
works, have got locked into the most divergent and internationally 
inconsistent  mix of fiscal  and  monetary  policies since the war. And  why, 
temporarily,  they are feeling quite happy about it. But since they are 
only likely to read  the first  few pages, they could very easily-but  quite 
wrongly-conclude that  it provides  scientific  justification  for their  folly. 
Wing  T. Woo: Gilles  Oudiz  and  Jeffrey  Sachs  have  written  an  extremely 
original  paper on an important  and timely topic. Its most important 
contribution  is showing  us an ingenious  way of giving  empirical  content 
to theoretical  propositions  from game theory. Its most striking  conclu- 
sion is that  coordination  does not help very much. 
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of macro  policies-cooperation-as  coming  from altering  the terms on 
which  expansion  must  be traded  against  the  current  account  and  inflation. 
Independent  policy actions amplify  the effects on these two, whereas 
cooperative actions attenuate  them. Thus, in exchange  for the benefits 
of more  expansion,  any country  incurs  higher  costs through  a worsened 
current account and higher inflation if it acts alone rather than in 
cooperation  with others. A recent example where the costs of such an 
independent  policy course were large is provided  by France;  there the 
Mitterrand  government  was forced to drop its initial  attempt  to reflate 
on its own. 
Going it alone is difficult for France because its economy is  so 
intimately  linked  with the rest of Europe. When  Oudiz  and Sachs apply 
their methodology to quantifying  the relations involving the United 
States, West Germany,  and Japan, they find that the welfare gains of 
cooperation  are small.  Looking  at tables 12  and 13,  the gains  are so small 
that we can conclude that they are not worth the costs involved in 
organizing  and enforcing  policy coordination.  This suggests that policy 
coordination  is a little like love: "all reason is against  it but all healthy 
instinct  is for it." Being an unabashed  romantic,  I quickly  note that the 
authors' gains are small only because of the utility functions that they 
have pulled  out via revealed  preferences. 
One important  question is whether the Oudiz-Sachs  utility weights 
are really those of the policymakers;  two reasons why they may not be 
come quickly  to mind.  The  first  is that  the models  may  be wrong.  On  this 
issue,  although criticisms of large models rest on  solid theoretical 
grounds, I agree with the authors that they offer useful, pragmatic 
answers, and the authors' main conclusions appear  to be similar  with 
both their models. The second reason that the reported  utility weights 
may not be those of policymakers  is that the baseline  may be a Stackel- 
berg equilibrium  rather  than a Nash equilibrium.  A case can be made 
that, since World  War II, the United States has played the leadership 
role in the setting  of macro  policies within  the major  industrial  countries, 
taking  into  account  the reaction  functions  of the other  countries  in setting 
its own policies. If so, this would  make  the available  trade-offs  different 
and so would make the utility weights one infers from the data quite 
different  from  those the authors  estimate. 
In general, the simple characterization  of national  utility functions 
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tractable  may have missed some important  dimensions  of the problem. 
For example, the welfare  assessment  of a change  in the U.S. policy mix 
that is reported  in table 16 does not address  two important  criticisms  of 
the present  policy mix of loose fiscal policy and tight monetary  policy. 
The  first  criticism  of the present  policy mix  focuses on the long  run.  High 
deficits crowd out investment and finally lead to a new steady state 
which has a lower capital-labor  ratio. The second criticism  pertains  to 
middle-run  considerations.  Oudiz  and Sachs point out in the first  part  of 
their  paper  that deficits are unsustainable  when the real interest rate is 
higher  than  the growth  rate.  We take  off on an  unstable  path  along  which, 
eventually,  all taxes are  used to pay interest.  But the objectives  of faster 
and sustainable  economic growth  are not in the authors'  welfare  func- 
tion. A more complete analysis, I suspect, would show greater  welfare 
gains  to all parties. 
The large negative utility weights on inflation  that the authors find 
may reflect  a dynamic  aspect of policymaking  that is not treated  in this 
paper.  The  government  may  be engaged  in  a game  within  its own borders. 
In a situation  where  labor  unions  have market  power  and  aim  to improve 
the relative  wage of their  members,  it may be better  for a government  to 
adopt a hard-line  policy of nonaccommodation  rather than either to 
accept inflation  or attempt  to contain  it through  a direct policy such as 
wage-price  guideposts. This policy stance, which can be described as 
''you break  it, you own it,'"  forces unions  to think  in terms  of a trade-off 
between higher  wages and higher  unemployment.  With it, the govern- 
ment  may  believe it can  produce  a better  trade-off  than  Oudiz  and  Sachs, 
or anyone else, can estimate  from  past data. 
The authors  have not addressed  one important  argument  for policy 
coordination  that  is relevant  within  their  utility  framework.  They  assume 
that reactions  of one country  to another's  policy will inevitably  lead to 
stable  equilibrium.  But in a sequential  decisionmaking  process in which 
each country  does not take into account  the reaction  of its neighbors,  a 
stable  outcome is not assured.  The aggravation  of the global  depression 
in the 1930s  caused by competitive  devaluations  is a case in point. 
More also needs to be said about  the problems  of coordination.  One 
such problem, which came out of the 1978 Bonn summit locomotive 
experience, is the need for optimal contingency plans. At the Bonn 
summit,  the United  States agreed  to tighten  its policies and  to reduce  oil 
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their  annual  growth  rates  by 1  percent  and 1.5  percent,  respectively. But 
six months later the shah of Iran was overthrown and Iranian oil 
production  was drastically  reduced.  The resulting  50 percent  rise in the 
price  of oil was followed by the second OPEC  price shock, which  tripled 
oil prices  in  two years. Thus  high  inflation  rates  and  large  current  account 
deficits  in Germany  and  Japan  came  in the wake of the Bonn  agreements. 
The  experience  left a negative  feeling  regarding  coordination,  which  was 
evident in various statements  issued  just before the Williamsburg  sum- 
mit. 
General  Discussion 
Robert Lawrence saw the study's main results as a plausible  expla- 
nation  for the lack of U.S. interest in policy coordination.  In his work 
on the synchronization  of the international  business cycle, Lawrence 
had  found that  the direct  linkages  among  countries  accounted  for only a 
small part of the synchronization.  The synchronization  of the cycle is 
largely explained by individual  policies responding  independently  to 
common  disturbances.  He argued  that  the clamor  for  policy  coordination 
has become the substitute for making difficult choices and said the 
Europeans  should  accept the responsibility  for their  own actions  and  the 
onus of mastering  their  own circumstances. 
Other  panelists questioned  the realism  of the authors'  procedure  for 
estimating  welfare  gains. Charles  Schultze found the mechanical  appli- 
cation of the revealed  preference  approach  was inappropriate.  He noted 
that even the Reagan administration  now regarded  the present U.S. 
policy mix as a mistake. The baseline used in most of the study should 
be seen as the outcome of ill-conceived  actions rather  than  of deliberate 
optimizing  behavior. James Duesenberry  reasoned that extreme out- 
comes were not modeled correctly  by the linear  relationships  assumed 
in the study. As an important  example, the impact of current  account 
deficits on foreigners' attitude toward dollar-denominated  assets and 
hence on the value of the exchange rate was likely to be nonlinear.  He 
concluded that the reaction of exchange markets  to continued record 
current account deficits cannot be extrapolated from their present 
reaction,  and  the benefits  of changing  from  present  policies was probably 
greater  than  the model  projected. 
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projected  by the models might  be misleading.  As an example, the use of 
contractionary  monetary  policy to fight  inflation  through  exchange rate 
appreciation  might  work  over a short  horizon  but  be self-defeating  in the 
long run as the exchange rate depreciates  to its former  level when the 
economy returns to full employment. The inflationary  impact of the 
depreciating  exchange  rate  must  be weighed  against  the earlier  deflation- 
ary gains from appreciation. Sachs acknowledged that some effects 
might  be modified  or conceivably  even reversed  when looked at beyond 
the horizon  of the model, as in Krugman's  example.  But he did  not agree 
that the short-run  welfare results would be overturned.  With  the quad- 
ratic  loss function  that was used, the welfare  costs of a given exchange 
rate movement depend on the contemporaneous  inflation  rate. There 
would thus be a net welfare gain from appreciating  the exchange rate 
when inflation  is high and then allowing  it to return  to its former  level 
when inflation is  zero.  More generally, Oudiz observed that what 
arguments  were appropriate  in the objective function  depended  on the 
time period of the analysis. It was possible to conceive of a long-run 
analysis  and  objective  function.  But  this lay beyond  the scope of present 
quantitative  models  and,  possibly, beyond  the interest  of present  policy- 
makers. 